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EFFECTS OF CONTEXT AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES ON MEMORY FOR 
PRIOR REMEMBERING 
Marcus L. Leppanen 
July 13, 2018 
Though people often remember experiences from their lives, they are also able to 
remember whether a memory has previously been retrieved, which is known as memory 
for prior remembering.  Frequent failures of memory for prior remembering can have 
negative consequences on how people perceive their own cognitive health.  The 
recurrence of traumatic memory retrieval can be interpreted as a consequence of intrusive 
memory for prior remembering.  This dissertation was conducted to improve our 
understanding of the factors that influence the efficacy of memory for prior remembering.  
The two factors that were investigated were context change and individual differences.  
Participants (N = 180) completed a three-phase memory procedure.  In the first phase, 
participants learned a series of cue-target word pairs.  In the second phase, participants 
were given a cued-recall test (Test 1) for some of the pairs that they learned.  Half of 
those targets were tested in the same context as the learning phase (same-context targets) 
and the other half were tested in a new context in which one feature had changed from 
the learning phase (changed-context targets).  Three different types of contextual features 
could have changed in between-subjects fashion: the semantic context, background color 
context, or screen location context.  In the third phase, participants were given a second 
cued-recall test (Test 2) in which all of the learned targets were tested in the original 
study context.  During the third phase, participants were also asked to make a judgment 
about whether each target was retrieved during Test 1.  Results showed that memory for 
prior remembering was only impaired for changed-context targets in the semantic change 
condition.  Participants also completed questionnaires to measure individual differences 
in dispositional mindfulness and absorption.  The only significant predictor of memory 
for prior remembering was absorption and only in the semantic change condition.  The 
findings support a distinction between categorizing contextual features into local and 
global categories based on their associations with memory for stimuli and memory for 
prior remembering.  Individual difference findings are discussed with respect to whether 
attention is focused on internal thoughts or external stimuli.  Future directions and 
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 People not only remember the events of their lives, but also whether they have 
recollected those events previously.  In some instances, people also make judgments 
about whether they have previously recollected a memory before or if they do not think 
they have.  The focus of this dissertation will be on one type of judgment that people 
make, specifically when they decide whether or not they have previously remembered 
something before, which will be referred to as their memory for prior remembering.  
People are frequently asked to make judgments about their memory retrieval.  For 
example, people are often asked on clinical assessments how often they have retrieved 
memories of traumatic events (e.g., the Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale for the 
DSM-5; Weathers et al., 2013).  Such assessments rest on the assumption that people can 
accurately remember their own prior remembering.  The accuracy of our memory for 
prior remembering is also relevant to the debate over the validity of repressed, or 
recovered, memories (e.g., Schooler, 2001).  For those reasons, it is important to better 
understand what affects the accuracy of memory for prior remembering.  The specific 
purpose of this dissertation was to explore factors that influence how well people 
remember their own prior instances of memory retrieval and whether particular 
individual differences are related to how accurately people judge their own prior 








To test factors that influence memory for prior remembering a three-phase 
memory procedure was adapted to address two important questions.  The first question 
was: What types of contextual features can be changed across instances of retrieval that 
will lead to impaired memory for prior remembering?  Currently, it is only known that 
changes to semantic context (e.g., Arnold & Lindsay, 2002) and the method of retrieving 
information (e.g., free recall versus recognition; Padilla-Walker & Poole, 2002) have 
effects on the accuracy of memory for prior remembering.  How those factors influence 
memory for prior remembering will be discussed further in the Contextual Features and 
Memory for Prior Remembering section of this dissertation.  It has been proposed that 
memory for prior remembering operates on the same principles as memory for stimuli.  
As such, it should be possible to determine whether other types of contextual features 
(e.g., background, location) that are associated with memory for stimuli are also 
associated with memory for prior remembering.  Because memories can be embedded in 
a large number of contextual details, it is important to demonstrate whether any effects of 
context change on memory for prior remembering can be generalized across multiple 
kinds of context.   
The second question was: Can individual differences in the accuracy of memory 
for prior remembering be predicted by personality traits?  People differ in the accuracy of 
their memory for prior remembering, but the underlying causes of those differences 
remain unknown.  Understanding individual differences in memory for prior 
remembering can lead to the development of theories about what causes some people to 
have better memory for prior remembering than others.  Differences in how people attend 








cognitions are encoded into memory.  Specifically, being mindful of, or absorbed in, 
one’s cognitions could affect the accuracy of memory for prior remembering.  The 
research supporting why mindfulness and absorption were tested in this dissertation is 
evaluated in greater detail in the Individual Differences and Memory for Prior 
Remembering section. 
 The following sections form the body of the literature review and establish the 
framework behind the design of this dissertation, the specific research questions, and my 
research hypotheses.  In the following section, I will discuss what memory for prior 
remembering is and current theorizing about why people forget about prior acts of 
memory retrieval.  Then I will discuss the role that context plays in memory for stimuli 
and memory for prior remembering.  There will be specific discussions about the types of 
contextual features I studied in this dissertation: background color and screen location.  
At the end of the context section will be a re-statement of the first research question and 
my hypotheses.  Then the discussion will shift to individual differences in memory.  That 
section will begin with a general discussion of why individual differences are important 
for memory research before narrowing to what is known about individual differences in 
memory for prior remembering.  There will then be specific sub-sections addressing the 
individual differences of interest: dispositional mindfulness (Brown & Ryan, 2003) and 
absorption (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974).  The literature review will end with a discussion 
of the hypotheses related to the individual difference measures. 
Making Judgments about Prior Remembering 
 Memory for prior remembering is one type of metamemory judgment.  In this 








own memory.  Metamemory judgments can include predictive judgments of future 
learning (e.g., Hartwig & Dunlosky, 2017), assessments of whether a memory was 
previously retrieved or not (e.g., Arnold & Lindsay, 2002), or reports about the quality of 
a recollection (e.g., Mickes, Seale-Carlisle, & Wixted, 2013).  Memory for prior 
remembering is a metamemory process that involves people making judgments about 
whether they believe a piece of information they just retrieved was also retrieved at 
another time in the past.  Despite the fact that people frequently make judgments about 
their prior remembering, researchers have questioned whether metamemory judgments 
are accurate (e.g., Joslyn, Loftus, McNoughton, & Powers, 2001; Parks, 1999; Pope & 
Hudson, 1995).  Because of the malleable nature of memory and the potential for people 
to incorporate misinformation into retrieved memories (see Loftus, 2005 for a review), it 
is important to further understand what factors influence how accurate memory for prior 
remembering is and why failures of memory for prior remembering occur.   
The accuracy of memory for prior remembering has been of interest for over two 
decades.  Parks (1999) explored memory for previous instances of retrieving childhood 
memories using a two-phase procedure.  In the first phase, participants were brought into 
the laboratory and asked to retrieve memories from their childhood in response to 
prompts for specific types of events (e.g., “Do you remember your first bicycle?”).  Later, 
in the second phase, participants attempted to recollect some of the same events, as well 
as new ones.  During the second phase, participants were also asked to make judgments 
about how recently they thought about the events they just recollected.  Researchers have 
demonstrated that participants frequently forget that they had retrieved specific memories 








for weeks or years prior to the experiment.  Participants can demonstrate that forgetting 
when the two acts of retrieval are separated by only a few minutes within the same 
experimental session (Parks, 1999) or when they are separated by as much as two weeks 
(Merckelbach et al., 2006).  Parks proposed that people have inaccurate memory for their 
prior remembering because of a bias to underestimate how recently a memory has been 
retrieved. 
Schooler (2001) proposed that changes in subjective experience affect memory 
for prior remembering.  Schooler’s ideas came following interviews in which people 
described an experience of forgetting that they previously retrieved a memory for a 
highly emotional event, specifically instances of childhood sexual abuse.  Schooler found 
people who reported recovering their memories for a past experience of sexual abuse that 
they believed they had never retrieved before.  Despite their reports, evidence was found 
that those people had previously recollected the abuse to a confidant and had forgotten 
that previous act of recollection.  Schooler posited that the subjective experience 
associated with the recollection of a memory affects whether that act of recollection is 
remembered later.  The subjective experience of memory retrieval can be defined as the 
emotional or conceptual interpretation of the memory at the time of retrieval.  The 
emotional and conceptual aspect of a memory may not remain the same over time and 
changes to those types of interpretations are argued to impair memory for prior 
remembering. 
Schooler suggested that the surprise and distress that occurred from recollecting a 
memory of abuse in a therapeutic setting was highly distinct from recollecting the same 








a memory should itself be memorable.  However, if the memory was previously 
recollected in a calmer fashion, then that previous recollection may not be salient in the 
context of the newer, highly emotional response to the more recent retrieval.  In other 
words, a highly emotional act of retrieving an experience of childhood sexual abuse could 
be unlikely to remind someone that they had previously retrieved the memory before if 
the previous recollection occurred in a less distressing fashion.  Such different 
experiences could lead a person to forget a prior instance of recollection.  In extreme 
cases, people may even claim to have entirely forgotten that an act of retrieval ever 
occurred, which Schooler (2001) termed the “forgot-it-all-along effect.”  The factors that 
are currently known to affect the subjective experience of memories in a way that impairs 
memory for prior remembering are discussed in the following section. 
Contextual Features and Memory for Prior Remembering 
The following section will address the first of two research questions: Are 
contextual features other than semantic context associated with memory for prior 
remembering?  Research has demonstrated that changing semantic context impairs 
memory for prior remembering (Arnold & Lindsay, 2002), but why is that important and 
what does it tell us about human memory?  In particular, this dissertation was designed to 
test the theory that memory for prior remembering operates on the same principles as 
memory for stimuli (Arnold & Lindsay, 2002; 2005).  That theory is supported by 
evidence that changes in semantic context affect both memory for prior remembering 
(e.g., Arnold & Lindsay, 2002) and recognition accuracy (e.g., Tulving & Thomson, 
1973).  I will first discuss what is known about the relationship between semantic context 








roles of subjective experience and encoding specificity in memory for prior remembering.  
I will end the section by discussing the gap in the literature that can be filled by this 
dissertation. 
  Arnold and Lindsay (2002) tested whether changes to semantic context could 
create a change in subjective experience that would impair memory for prior 
remembering.  They tested that idea using a three-phase procedure.   In the study phase of 
Arnold and Lindsay’s paradigm, participants viewed semantically-related cue-target word 
pairs (e.g., hand – palm, dog – bark).  In each pair, the target was a homograph with two 
meanings that were established by two distinct cue words (e.g., palm could refer to part 
of your hand or a type of tree).  Participants then completed a cued-recall test (referred to 
as Test 1) for some of the studied words.  Critically, some of the words were cued with 
the same word from study (same-cue targets, e.g., hand – p _ _ m), others were cued with 
a previously unseen word that was also related to a previously studied target (changed-
cue targets, e.g., birch – b _ _ k), and others were not tested at all during Test 1 (not 
tested targets).  This created a situation in which, during Test 1, the semantic context of 
some of the targets changed, while it remained the same for others.  Participants then 
completed a second cued-recall test (referred to as Test 2) in which memory for all the 
targets was tested in the original study context.  Memory for prior remembering was 
tested for each target during Test 2 by asking participants if the target they retrieved was 
also retrieved during Test 1.  It has consistently been found that memory for prior 
remembering is worse when the context changes between Tests 1 and 2, compared to 








Geraerts et al., 2006; Leppanen & Lyle, 2018; Raymaekers, Peters, Smeets, Abidi, & 
Merckelbach, 2011). 
Context change is believed to affect memory for prior remembering because it is 
assumed that memory for prior remembering follows the encoding specificity principle.  
The encoding specificity principle states the ability to retrieve a memory is directly 
related to the amount of overlap between the conditions that are present at retrieval and 
those that were present at encoding (Tulving & Thomson, 1973).  In the memory for prior 
remembering paradigm, the act of retrieving a target during Test 1 is encoded with the 
features that are present during that act of retrieval (e.g., the semantic context).  Arnold 
and Lindsay (2002; 2005) showed that remembering an act of retrieval is better when the 
features present during Test 2 match those from Test 1 (same-context targets) and it is 
impaired when they differ (changed-context targets).  They argued that a change in 
semantic context led participants to interpret the targets in subjectively different ways 
across acts of retrieval (e.g., thinking about palm as part of your body is distinct from 
thinking about palm as a type of tree).   
According to the encoding specificity principle, a change in subjective experience 
between acts of retrieval would make the Test 2 retrieval context unlikely to cue a 
memory for the act of Test 1 retrieval.  Even though the target remains the same between 
Test 1 and Test 2, when the conditions surrounding the target change memory for prior 
remembering is impaired.  The subjective experience of a target differs following 
changes in semantic context because the same word is interpreted in two distinct ways.  
When the word palm is interpreted as being part of the body during Test 2, it would be a 








of the encoding specificity principle.  Such a distinction is not present for same-context 
targets because it is assumed that no change in subjective experience occurs when the 
semantic context remains the same across tests. 
Further support for the role of encoding specificity in memory for prior 
remembering comes from an experiment which explored the role of response format in 
memory for prior remembering.  Padilla-Walker and Poole (2002) had participants listen 
to a list of recorded sentences that were all similar in structure (i.e., all of the sentences 
included a subject, verb, and action).  Following study, participants were asked to freely 
recall as many sentences as they could.  After participants heard a second list of distractor 
sentences and completed other distractor tasks, they were either asked to freely recall as 
many sentences from the first list as they could or were given a recognition test 
containing all of the original sentences as well as novel sentences that were not heard in 
the experiment.  Following that second recall attempt, participants were also asked to 
indicate whether they had retrieved the sentences during their first recall attempt or not.  
Participants were more likely to falsely indicate that a sentence was not previously 
retrieved following a recognition test than a second free recall test.  The authors argued 
that free recall tests and recognition tests may lead participants to think about the 
information they are recalling differently.   
Padilla-Walker and Poole’s (2002) argument supports Arnold and Lindsay’s 
(2002) idea that memory for prior remembering operates on the same principles as 
memory for stimuli.  The way in which participants retrieve information affects both 
memory for prior remembering (Padilla-Walker and Poole, 2002) and memory for stimuli 








memory for prior remembering paradigm, the response format can act as a to-be-
remembered cognitive operation and changes in how that operation is processed impair 
memory for prior remembering.  In contrast, the effect of response format on memory for 
stimuli is on the amount and type of information that is offered (Evans & Fisher, 2011).  
Despite supporting Arnold and Lindsay’s (2002) idea that changes in subjective 
experience across tests can impair memory for prior remembering, Padilla-Walker and 
Poole argued that future research could benefit by identifying what types of change can 
cause participants to forget their previous recollections. 
Other than understanding what factors impair memory for prior remembering, 
attempts have also been made to determine whether the impairment caused by changes in 
subjective experience can be alleviated.  Leppanen and Lyle (2018) had participants 
either retrieve or view study cues after retrieving targets during Test 1.  In separate 
experiments, participants were given one of three instructions: to overtly retrieve the 
study cue paired with the previous target, to copy the study cue paired with a given target 
after viewing it, or to overtly retrieve the study cue paired with the previous target while 
being told whether that target was a changed-context target or a same-context target.  
Leppanen and Lyle found that memory for prior remembering of changed-context targets 
was equivalent to that of same-context targets when participants overtly retrieved study 
cues, but not when they copied a presented study cue. 
Leppanen and Lyle (2018) suggested that the benefit to memory for prior 
remembering was the result of participants being reminded of the study context during 
Test 1.  They argued that being reminded of the previous context for a given target 








(which subsequently became the Test 2 retrieval context).  Such an association would 
create a scenario in which the Test 1 retrieval context could be brought to mind by the 
Test 2 retrieval context when it usually is not.  While reminding benefited memory for 
prior remembering of changed-context in all three experiments, the greatest improvement 
in the accuracy of memory for prior remembering followed overt memory retrieval.  The 
difference in the efficacy between what was termed reminding-via-retrieval and 
reminding-via-presentation was attributed to the benefit of retrieving information over re-
studying it (for a recent meta-analytic review, see Rowland, 2014).  In previous studies, 
participants were never asked to think about the study context during Test 1 (e.g., Arnold 
& Lindsay, 2002), yet it is likely that some participants did.  Leppanen and Lyle argued 
that individual differences in what they termed “spontaneous reminding” could underlie 
differences in memory for prior remembering.  People who are more frequently reminded 
of the context in which an experience occurred should be more likely to remember their 
prior retrievals by having a greater number of associations with the act of memory 
retrieval.  Therefore, a second goal of this dissertation was to explore individual 
differences in personality traits that could be associated with how people attend to their 
own cognitions, which could influence levels of spontaneous reminding.  Individual 
differences in memory for prior remembering will be discussed in the Individual 
Differences in Memory for Prior Remembering section. 
The relationship between encoding specificity and memory for prior remembering 
can be further elucidated if it is assumed that memory for cognitive operations generally 
follows the same principles as memory for stimuli.  Arnold and Lindsay (2005) argued 








(Tulving & Thomson, 1973).  Recognition failure occurs when a target is cued with a 
different word at study than at test and is subsequently endorsed as a new target, rather 
than being recognized as old.  Recognition failure is tied to the act of learning a specific 
cue-target pairing, rather than any pre-experimental associations between a given cue-
target pairing.  For example, when the word light is studied with the word head (a word 
weakly-associated with light), it is typically easier to recall light when it is again 
presented with head than it is to recognize light when it is paired with dark (a word 
strongly-associated with light). 
Memory for prior remembering and memory for stimuli are also similarly affected 
differences in the detail of encoded information.  Stimuli that are encoded with greater 
detail, and subjectively experienced as more vivid, are remembered better than stimuli 
that are encoded in less detail.  For example, negatively valenced words have been shown 
to be encoded in more detail than neutral words and were subsequently remembered 
better (Kensinger & Corkin, 2003).  Similarly, acts of recollection that are rated as more 
vivid, have been shown to be more likely to be remembered than those that are rated as 
less vivid (Merckelbach et al., 2006). 
Despite what is currently known, it is my argument that prior research has yet to 
fully support the assumption that memory for prior remembering operates on the same 
principles as memory for stimuli.  Arnold and Lindsay (2005, p. 547) stated that “[their] 
findings suggest that remembering a prior episode of recollection is equivalent to 
remembering other sorts of prior episodes.  Hence, retrieval of evidence of prior 
remembering follows the same principles that govern retrieval of evidence of other sorts 








of the same principles as memory for stimuli.  Currently, that argument is only supported 
by evidence that changes in semantic context or retrieval method affect the accuracy of 
memory for prior remembering and memory for stimuli.  To provide more evidence for 
whether memory for prior remembering follows the same principles as memory for 
stimuli, other types of contextual features should be tested for associations with memory 
for prior remembering. 
Content versus Context of Memories 
Before discussing the specific types of context that were used in this dissertation 
to provide further support for Arnold and Lindsay’s (2002; 2005) ideas, it is necessary to 
have a clearer understanding of what context is and why it is important for encoding 
specificity.  Memories are often separated into their content and context (e.g., Bookbinder 
& Brainerd, 2016).  Content refers to the to-be-remembered information (e.g., a word 
pair, a picture, the topic of a conversation with a friend) and context is a broad term used 
to describe aspects of the environment in which content learning takes place.  For the 
purposes of this dissertation, context is defined as the spatiotemporal (e.g., where and 
when), perceptual (e.g., color), and internally generated (e.g., emotions) information that 
is associated with a stimulus as it is being learned (Skinner & Fernandes, 2009).  For 
example, when students attend a lecture, the facts that are being learned in the lecture are 
the content of their memory, but the classroom in which the lecture is taught is a 
contextual feature that can later be associated with the topic of the lecture.  The 
association of context with content is important because it helps to distinguish highly 
similar experiences with the same stimulus (for a similar interpretation of the role of 








a memory of seeing a tiger at the zoo.  That experience would be considered the content 
of the memory in this example. The context surrounding that content could be the zoo 
you were visiting, the weather that day, or how you felt about seeing the tiger.  It is 
possible that you have multiple experiences with seeing a tiger (e.g., in the zoo, in 
photographs).  You may have seen one tiger at the Louisville Zoo and another at the San 
Diego Zoo.  If someone asks you to recall your experience at the Louisville Zoo, you are 
able to separate that experience from the memory about the San Diego Zoo because the 
two experiences occurred in different contexts (e.g., locations). 
In the literature, many different contextual features have been associated with the 
accuracy of memory retrieval.  When memory retrieval is impaired by changes to a 
particular contextual feature, that finding can be used as evidence that the encoding 
specificity principle generalizes across types of contextual features.  For example, when 
the physical location in which participants learn a list of words differs from the location 
in which they are tested for those words, recall is typically impaired (e.g., Godden & 
Baddeley, 1975).  As mentioned previously, changing the semantic context of cue-target 
word pairs between study and a recognition test impairs recognition accuracy (Tulving & 
Thomson, 1973).  Participants have been shown to have worse recall performance when 
learning in an inebriated state and being tested sober than when learning and test occur in 
the same state, whether the same state is inebriated or sober (Goodwin, Powell, Bremer, 
Hoine, & Stern, 1969).  When the emotional state that a person is in when they generate 
autobiographical memories is the same as that on a subsequent test, memory for the 
previously generated events is better than when the emotional state differs between acts 








context can include many different features that, when changed, have an effect on the 
ability to remember stimuli.  Those effects are critical for extending the encoding 
specificity principle to memory for prior remembering. 
Many contextual features affect memory performance, but they are not all 
considered to have the same relationship with the content of our memories.  Different 
features can have different effects depending on the paradigm being used.  Changes in 
location affect recall accuracy, but they are oftentimes found to have no effect on 
recognition performance (e.g., Godden & Baddeley, 1980).  Researchers account for 
those types of disparities by grouping contextual features into categories with similar 
relationships to memory content.  It is impossible to discuss all possible methods of 
categorization in this dissertation and, as such, only three predominant theories will be 
briefly discussed.  First, one proposed method of categorizing contextual features is to 
use a local versus global categorization scheme (Dalton, 1993).  Local contextual features 
are those that are bound to one, or very few, items (e.g., semantic context) and global 
contextual features are bound to many different items (e.g., locations, emotions).  Second, 
other researchers separate contextual features into verbal and environmental categories 
(Franco-Watkins & Daugherty, 2006).  Verbal context is applied to contextual features 
that are described predominantly through the usage of words (i.e., equivalent to semantic 
context) and environmental context refers to everything else about the learning 
environment that does not require a verbal label to be processed (e.g., colors, locations).  
Third, others use intrinsic and extrinsic labels for different types of contextual features 
(Godden & Baddeley, 1980).  Intrinsic contextual features of stimuli are perceived and 








contextual features are often encoded incidentally (e.g., location).  Based on the 
categorization scheme being used, different predictions can be made for how different 
features will be associated with memory content. 
Arnold and Lindsay (2005) have endorsed the distinction between global and 
local contextual features.  They discussed how item-level (local) context had different 
effects on memory for prior remembering than global contextual features have on output 
monitoring (Marsh & Hicks, 2001).  Output monitoring, like memory for prior 
remembering, is a metamemory judgment about whether information has been 
recollected previously.  Output monitoring and memory for prior remembering are both 
measured using three-phase procedures.  A typical output monitoring procedure would 
begin with blocks of two alternating phases.  In the first of the two phases, participants 
are given a list of words to remember.  In the second phase, participants attempt to freely 
recall the list they just studied.  After a set number of lists, a third phase begins in which 
participants are given the output monitoring recognition test.  In the output monitoring 
recognition test, participants must indicate which items were targets they had previously 
retrieved, which were targets they had not retrieved, and which items were new.  The 
effects of global context on output monitoring have been assessed using Deese-Roediger-
McDermott (DRM) word lists (Roediger & McDermott, 1995).  A DRM word list 
includes semantically-related words (e.g., nurse, hospital, stethoscope) that all have high 
associative strength with one extra-list word (e.g., doctor) that is never studied, known as 
the critical lure.  It has been shown that people have trouble accurately monitoring their 
output of critical lures and often report previously retrieving critical lures, regardless of 








Arnold and Lindsay (2005) compared their findings to those of Marsh and Hicks 
(2001) by arguing that item-level semantic context has different effects on memory for 
prior remembering than global semantic context (established by DRM word lists) has on 
output monitoring.  Item-level contextual changes impaired memory for prior 
remembering, but list-wide semantic context increased the endorsement of critical lures.  
In both cases, metamemory judgments about prior retrieval are inaccurate.  The important 
distinction is that forgetting a prior instance of memory retrieval is an error of omission 
and endorsing a non-retrieved critical lure as previously retrieved is an error of 
commission.  When local contextual features change there is forgetting of prior 
remembering, but when items are learned in a consistent global context participants 
appear to adopt a more liberal response criterion and instead endorse items as previously 
remembered that were related to items they had actually remembered.  It remains to be 
tested how the two types of contextual features affect metamemory judgments using the 
same paradigm.  As such, aside from merely generalizing Arnold and Lindsay’s (2002) 
findings to new types of contextual features, it is of interest to specifically test whether 
changing global contextual features in the memory for prior remembering paradigm will 
have the same impairing effect as changing local contextual features. 
The present dissertation was designed to create a within-experiment comparison 
between the effect of changing a local contextual feature (semantic context) and the 
effects of changing global contextual features (background color and screen location) on 
memory for prior remembering.  It will be argued that changing background color and 
screen location may also lead to distinct representations of cue-target pairs because both 








next).  If memory for prior remembering operates on the same principles as memory for 
events, then such associations should also impact the accuracy of memory for prior 
remembering.  In particular when those features are changed there should be impaired 
memory for prior remembering.  Further, if memory for prior remembering follows the 
encoding specificity principle, then the results of this dissertation would provide evidence 
for whether background color and screen location affect the probability of Test 2 target 
retrieval cueing Test 1 target retrieval. 
Background Color Context Effects 
The first contextual feature which was used to extend Arnold and Lindsay’s 
(2002) findings was background color.  The effects of background color on memory for 
stimuli have been of interest to psychologists for nearly 90 years.  The earliest 
examinations looked at the effects of displaying target stimuli on colored cards.  
Researchers have shown that cued-recall of cue-target pairs made up of nonsense 
syllables was better when the color of the card on which pairs were presented remained 
the same between study and test compared to when the background changed.  That effect 
was strongest when a given color was paired with only one cue-target pair (Dulsky, 
1935).  In other words, background color had the strongest association with the content of 
a memory when it acted as a local contextual feature.  Later research demonstrated that 
participants took fewer trials to learn a set of cue-target word pairs when the pairs were 
presented on colored cards compared to when the cue-target pairs were presented on 
uniform gray backgrounds (Weiss & Margolious, 1954).  Dulsky’s (1935) findings were 
later extended from cued-recall to free recall by Isarida and Isarida (2007) who showed 








background they were studied on than those which were studied on a different color 
background.  Other researchers, however, have failed to find an association between 
background color and memory for prose when only one color was used (Pointer & Bond, 
1998).   
It has been suggested that the effects of background color on memory are 
determined by whether background color is encoded as a local contextual feature or a 
global contextual feature (Sakai, Isarida, & Isarida, 2010).  How background color is 
encoded is likely determined by how many stimulus items are paired with a given color 
and the frequency at which the color changes.  Color could be encoded locally if few 
items are paired with a given color and the color changes frequently, but color would 
instead be encoded globally if many items are paired with the same color and the color 
rarely changes.  Despite the mixed findings of previous research, there is greater 
empirical support for the idea that background color is in fact encoded with cue-target 
word pairs.  As such, changing background color between instances of retrieving cue-
target pairs may lead to distinct representations of the same target items and have an 
effect on memory for prior remembering. 
Screen Location Context Effects 
The second contextual feature that was used in this dissertation was screen 
location.  Location is often studied as the physical environment in which learning occurs 
(e.g., a classroom with a chalkboard, desks, and maps on the walls).  It has frequently 
been shown that changes in physical location between study and test impair memory 
retrieval compared to when study and test occur in the same location (e.g., Godden & 








interference that normally occurs when two word lists are learned back-to-back in the 
same location (e.g., Brinegar, et al., 2013).  Up to this point location has meant the 
general spatial location in which information is being learned.  However, location can 
also refer to the relative location of a stimulus within the environment (e.g., the relative 
location of items on a computer screen).  For example, it has been shown that changing 
the location of items that were learned in specific locations of a 4 x 4 grid on a computer 
screen slows down recognition responses and lowers identification accuracy compared to 
when the items remain in the same location (Murphy, Wynne, O’Rourke, Commins, & 
Roche, 2009).  It has also been shown that participants are able to use the position of a 
stimulus on screen, irrespective of any other visual landmarks, as a retrieval cue to speed 
responding when making judgments about whether an item was previously studied 
(Wang, Johnson, Zhang, & Wang, 2002).  Given these effects of screen location on 
memory performance, it is plausible that the location on screen in which cue-target word 
pairs are learned, and subsequently retrieved, will be associated with those word pairs 
and have an effect on memory for prior remembering. 
In conclusion, this section focused on context and the impact it has on memory.  
Previous theorizing has suggested that memory for prior remembering operates on the 
same principles as memory for stimuli and is similarly affected by contextual change 
(e.g., Arnold & Lindsay, 2002).  The predominant theoretical framework for researching 
memory for prior remembering focuses on the encoding specificity principle.  Yet, the 
evidence supporting the theory that memory for prior remembering follows the encoding 
specificity principle is limited.  This dissertation was designed to address that gap in 








remembering follows the encoding specificity principle.  Specifically, background color 
and screen location were used to test whether global contextual features have a similar 
effect on memory for prior remembering as local contextual features. 
Context Effect Hypotheses 
 As a reminder, the specific research question being asked is whether contextual 
features other than semantic context are associated with the accuracy of memory for prior 
remembering.  To answer the proposed research question, the memory for prior 
remembering paradigm used by Leppanen and Lyle (2018) was adapted to include 
changes to different contextual features across Tests 1 and 2.  In this paradigm, 
participants studied cue-target pairings and were subsequently given two cued-recall tests 
for the targets.  Critically, during the second cued-recall test, participants were also asked 
to make a judgment about whether they previously retrieved each target on Test 1.  The 
novel contribution of this dissertation was to compare the effects of changing semantic 
context on memory for prior remembering and the effects of changing background color 
and screen location.  Those comparisons were made in a between-subjects fashion across 
conditions in which only one contextual feature was changed between Test 1 and Test 2.  
The to-be-remembered stimuli were equated across conditions by using the same cue-
target pairings.  The dependent measure of interest was the accuracy of participants’ 
memory for their prior remembering.  Full details of the procedure are provided in 
Chapter II. 
This design allowed for three between-condition comparisons on the effects of 
contextual change on memory for prior remembering.  Those comparisons were between 








memory for prior remembering.  According to the encoding specificity principle and the 
ideas of Arnold and Lindsay (2002), contextual features that are associated with memory 
for stimuli should also be associated with memory for prior remembering.  Therefore, it 
was hypothesized that a similar pattern of results would be found across all three 
conditions.  Memory for prior remembering of same-context targets was expected to be 
better than that of changed-context targets in all three conditions.  Alternatively, it must 
be acknowledged that changes to background color and screen location may not affect the 
qualitative interpretation of the retrieved targets.  Previous research suggests that 
qualitative changes are required to impair the accuracy of memory for prior remembering 
(e.g. Arnold & Lindsay, 2002; Schooler, 2001).  If background color and screen location 
do not affect the subjective experience of cue-target word pairs, then judgments of prior 
remembering for changed-context targets would only be impaired in the semantic change 
condition.  It has also been suggested that local contextual features may have different 
effects on memory for prior remembering than global contextual features (Arnold and 
Lindsay, 2005).  The distinction between local and global contextual features would be 
supported by any finding that demonstrates the contextual features in this dissertation 
have different effects on memory for prior remembering. 
Individual Differences and Memory for Prior Remembering 
 The following section will address the second of the two research questions: Are 
individual differences in internally-focused attention associated with the accuracy of 
memory for prior remembering?  Generally speaking, individual differences research 
attempts to describe how the ways people differ affect behavior.  As with any 








previous instances of memory retrieval.  Those differences in accuracy are likely to be 
associated with individual differences in other measurable traits.  However, which 
individual differences are related to performance on the memory for prior remembering 
task are poorly understood.  This section will first focus on a general discussion of 
individual differences research, before narrowing to some of the known individual 
differences in memory.  Then, the extent to which individual differences have been 
associated with memory for prior remembering will be discussed.  After that, the 
discussion will focus on how internal processing of information may underlie 
performance on the memory for prior remembering task.  There will then will two 
subsections which focus on the individual differences that were measured in this 
dissertation – dispositional mindfulness and absorption – before ending with a summary 
of the research hypotheses.  Exploring which individual differences affect memory for 
prior remembering will allow for a more informed discussion about the potential 
cognitive mechanisms that underlie performance on the memory for prior remembering 
task developed by Arnold and Lindsay (2002).   
For the purposes of this dissertation, the discussion will focus on individual 
differences that have been associated with memory.  Individual differences in personality 
traits (e.g., anxiety; Krans, de Bree, & Bryant, 2014), brain morphology (e.g., 
hippocampal volume; Maguire, Woollett, & Spiers, 2006), and cognitive abilities (e.g., 
working memory ability; Unsworth, Brewer, & Spillers, 2013) are just some of the 
categories of individual differences which have been shown to affect memory for stimuli.  
With so many individual differences associated with memory for stimuli, there are many 








remembering.  Arnold and Lindsay (2002; 2005) proposed that memory for prior 
remembering operates on the same principles as memory for stimuli.  Therefore, if a 
given individual difference is associated with memory for stimuli, it should also be 
associated with memory for prior remembering. 
To my knowledge, only one study has been conducted that attempted to measure 
individual differences in memory for prior remembering.  Raymaekers et al. (2011) 
compared participants’ scores on a variety of questionnaires to their performance on the 
memory for prior remembering paradigm developed by Arnold and Lindsay (2002).  
Scores on the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ, Broadbent, Cooper, Fitzgerald, & 
Parkes, 1982), the Creative Experiences Questionnaire (Merckelbach, Horselenberg, & 
Muris, 2001), and the Dissociative Experiences Questionnaire (Bernstein & Putnam, 
1986) were correlated with a single measure of memory for prior remembering 
performance.  In their experiment, memory for prior remembering was measured using a 
difference score.  As was stated in the introduction, there are two main dependent 
variables in the memory for prior remembering paradigm: the proportions of same- and 
changed-context targets correctly judged during Test 2 as having been previously 
retrieved during Test 1.  Raymaekers et al. (2011) subtracted the proportion of correct 
judgments of prior remembering for changed-cue targets from that of same-cue targets.  
Using the difference score, only one significant result was found.  Scores on the CFQ 
were negatively correlated with memory for prior remembering.  The authors argued that 
lower scores on the CFQ reflect a positive view of one’s own memory ability.  








previously retrieved a target during Test 1 that they would clearly remember the 
experience, because of their belief that they have good memory.  
People who are low in cognitive failures could be likely to adopt a conservative 
estimate of their prior remembering.  Using a conservative response criterion, participants 
could reject a changed-context target as being previously retrieved because they do not 
have a strong memory for the prior recollection following the change in context.  The 
same pattern would not apply to same-context targets, which are already consistently 
endorsed as previously retrieved.  Such a pattern of conservative responding would lead 
to a smaller difference score.  Raymaekers and colleagues’ use of a difference score, 
however, makes it impossible to properly interpret why difference scores are smaller in 
those who endorse high amounts of cognitive failures. 
The issue with Raymaekers et al. (2011) using a difference score is the reduction 
of two dependent variables into one variable.  Whether a particular difference is exhibited 
in same-context or changed-context performance could have important implications for 
the underlying mechanisms of memory for prior remembering.  Currently, it is unknown 
what the relationship is between scores on the CFQ and the different cue types that would 
have led to smaller difference scores.  The explanation given by Raymaekers et al. (2011) 
suggests that response criteria underlie their findings.  People are more or less likely to 
endorse a previous memory as retrieved depending on how accurate they think their own 
remembering is.  People who report fewer cognitive failures may think that they are more 
accurate.  Because changed-context targets are often found to be endorsed as being 
previously retrieved less often than same-context targets (e.g., Arnold & Lindsay, 2002; 








memory affects the different kinds of targets individually.  Did participants who scored 
high in cognitive failures have worse memory for prior remembering of same-context 
targets or better memory for prior remembering of changed-context targets?  Either 
outcome would result in smaller difference scores, but would have distinct theoretical 
interpretations.  In one instance, there is a detriment to memory for prior remembering 
that does not involve contextual shifts, while in the other there is an improvement in 
memory for prior remembering despite contextual shifts.  Even though the results from 
the Raymaekers et al. (2011) experiment are difficult to interpret, they provide a 
theoretical starting point for future research. 
As discussed in the previous section, the underlying assumption of the present 
dissertation is that memory for prior remembering follows the same principles as memory 
for stimuli.  In particular, memory for prior remembering has been shown to follow the 
encoding specificity principle (Arnold & Lindsay, 2002; 2005; Padilla-Walker & Poole, 
2002).  It follows that individual differences which are associated with the encoding and 
retrieval of stimuli should also be associated with the encoding and retrieval of a 
cognitive operation like memory.  Much like the ability to remember a stimulus, the 
ability to remember an act of memory retrieval should be affected by the cognitive 
processing that occurs during learning. 
How deeply people process their own cognitions could potentially affect how well 
they remember those cognitions.  Some people may choose to think about their 
cognitions deeply, but others may notice them and move on from them, and yet others 
may actively try to suppress their own cognitions.  It will be argued that these different 








point in time.  I describe these preferences to process cognitions in distinct ways as types 
of internal focus on cognition.  Individual differences in internally-focused cognition 
could be related to how people allocate their attention.  The allocation of attention 
directly affects memory.  Greater attentional focus during learning improves later recall, 
while divided attention leads to memory impairment (e.g., Baddeley, Lewis, Eldridge, & 
Thomson, 1984).   Attentional resources can be directed to cognitive processes or external 
stimuli which could subsequently affect what types of information people choose to 
elaborate on and subsequently remember.   
As an example, say you have an interaction with your neighbor’s dog.  During 
that experience you may think back to previous experiences you had with that same dog, 
to experiences you have had with the same breed of dog, or you may even think about an 
experience you had with your mother’s cat (because dogs and cats are both types of pets).  
All of those possibilities involve an internal focus on previous memories.  However, if 
you are focused on your current interaction with your neighbor’s dog you may not think 
about any of those other experiences at all and the current interaction will be what you 
focus on, which is instead a focus on external stimulation. 
In the memory for prior remembering paradigm, people likely differ in how they 
attend to Test 1 and the change in retrieval context.  Participants who naturally attend to, 
and elaborate on, the Test 1 retrieval context may come across an association with the 
learning context and naturally form an association between the two.  Such an association 
is believed to benefit memory for prior remembering (Leppanen & Lyle, 2018).  That 
theory could be tested by inferring the extent to which individuals both attend to, and 








individual differences in dispositional mindfulness (Brown & Ryan, 2003) and absorption 
(Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974) would be appropriate because both traits are theorized to 
involve differing levels of internal focus on cognition, which will be explained in greater 
detail in the subsections to follow. 
Whether focus is drawn to internal thoughts or to external stimulation can affect 
how well an experience becomes integrated into our prior knowledge and the associations 
that can be made to previous experiences.  The integration of a new experience into prior 
knowledge can occur through elaboration, which is a process that has been found to 
benefit memory.  The effects of elaboration are often studied using the levels-of-
processing framework.  Craik and Lockhart (1972) proposed the levels of processing 
theory to account for research evidence that processing information deeply (e.g., thinking 
about a word’s meaning) can lead to better memory for that information than shallow 
processing (e.g., counting the number of vowels in a word).  Similar evidence was found 
in an experiment in which Warren, Hughes, and Tobias (1985) asked participants to 
remember a list of adjectives.  Participants who elaborated on the list of adjectives during 
study (e.g., thinking about how the adjective relates to a specific memory) were found to 
remember more of those adjectives than participants who merely rated the pleasantness of 
the adjectives.  The researchers argued that elaboration led to a larger network of 
associations between the adjectives and previous autobiographical memories, which 
increased the number of possible retrieval cues for the studied items.   
It would be predicted that greater internal focus on an act of memory retrieval 
would lead to more accurate memory for prior remembering.  It could be that participants 








associations between a given act of memory retrieval and other experiences from their 
lives (or even within the experiment).  Findings from our laboratory have shown that 
being reminded of the learning context (which subsequently becomes the Test 2 retrieval 
context) during Test 1 improves memory for prior remembering of changed-context 
targets (Leppanen & Lyle, 2018).  We argued that this improvement was the result of an 
association being formed between the learning context, the Test 1 retrieval context, and 
the target.  Associating all three of those pieces of information would make the Test 2 
retrieval context more likely to cue Test 1 target retrieval.  Such an association could be 
formed by elaborative processing and would be particularly beneficial for remembering 
prior retrieval of changed-context targets.  It could also be the case that deeper 
elaboration of an act of retrieval simply leads to stronger learning of the act of memory 
retrieval through extra-experimental associations, which could also lead to more accurate 
memory for prior remembering. 
It is also important to theorize about whether a lack of internal focus could harm 
memory for prior remembering.  It has been argued that mindful attention involves an 
awareness of individual items of attention and the shifting of attention away from those 
items prevents elaboration of the attended information (Bishop et al., 2004).  In the 
memory for prior remembering paradigm, participants who focus too much attention on 
current retrieval contexts could be less likely to think about any other context in which 
the stimuli may have been experienced (i.e., they may not think back to the study 
context).  If highly focused attention to individual items reduces elaboration of those 








prior remembering in the face of contextual change where an ability to elaborate across 
contexts is important. 
As a reminder, the second research question being asked is whether individual 
differences in internally-guided attention are associated with the accuracy of memory for 
prior remembering.  That question was explored by associating the accuracy of memory 
for prior remembering with attention using two well-researched personality traits that are 
related to memory and internally-guided attention: mindfulness and absorption.  As will 
be described next, both traits describe a person’s tendency to focus attention on present-
moment circumstances.  Mindfulness involves the tendency for people to focus their 
attention on sensations and feelings in a nonjudgmental manner (Kabat-Zinn, 2003), 
which is different from how absorption involves a heightened focus and allocation of 
perceptual resources on individual objects of attention (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974).  The 
following two subsections will focus the discussion on mindfulness and absorption 
separately, but will involve similar argumentative structure.  Each subsection will begin 
with a general description of what mindfulness and absorption are.  Then, evidence will 
be provided that mindfulness and absorption are related to memory retrieval and 
attention.  That will be followed with a discussion of the theoretical associations between 
a given trait and memory for prior remembering.  After discussing both mindfulness and 
absorption the section will end with a general summary and a description of the research 
hypotheses. 
Mindfulness 
 Mindfulness is a trait that has received considerable attention in the literature.  








experience (Brown & Ryan, 2003) and as awareness of present-moment emotions and 
state of mind (Kabat-Zinn, 2003).  Mindfulness is often measured using self-report 
questionnaires.  Two of the most popular are the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale 
(MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003) and the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; 
Baer et al., 2008).  The MAAS measures awareness to the present moment with questions 
that ask about the frequency of certain mindful experiences (Brown & Ryan, 2003), 
whereas instead the FFMQ measures behaviors related to observing, describing, acting 
with awareness, nonjudgment of inner experience, and nonreactivity to inner experience 
(Baer et al., 2008).  Using these questionnaires (and others), mindfulness has been shown 
to have positive effects on both psychological (Brown & Ryan, 2003) and physical 
(Monti et al., 2006) well-being.  Some of the benefits of being mindful include: 
reductions in anxiety and increased positive affect (Brown & Ryan, 2003), an improved 
ability to cope with pain (Cioffi & Holloway, 1993), and an upregulation of the auto-
immune response (Davidson et al., 2003). 
Mindfulness may also lead to internally-focused attention that improves the 
accuracy of memory for prior remembering.  As a therapeutic technique, with overall 
quality of life benefits, mindfulness is taught as a strategy which can be used to alter how 
people focus their attention on their own thoughts and perceptions (Bishop et al., 2004).  
Altering how people attend to their own thoughts is likely to have an effect on how well 
they remember those thoughts.  Attending to our cognitions and elaborating on them may 
improve our ability to remember them.   
Mindfulness has been argued to both promote and hinder elaboration.  For 








reduces response criterion, and widens access to our network of semantic knowledge 
during retrieval (Rosenstreich, 2016).  A widened semantic network would likely 
counteract the impairment caused by changes in semantic context that typically impair 
memory for prior remembering by allowing participants easier access to multiple 
meanings of the target words.  Participants with access to a wider semantic network 
should more likely be cued to previous semantic contexts despite a change in context, 
compared to participants with a smaller semantic network.  According to prior theorizing 
(e.g., Arnold & Lindsay, 2002), memory for prior remembering should not be impaired if 
the retrieval context during Test 2 successfully cues that from Test 1.  If that were the 
case, then memory for prior remembering should be positively correlated with 
dispositional mindfulness.  Such a result would also support the claim that increased 
focus on cognition is associated with better memory for prior remembering. 
Conversely, mindfulness may instead hinder elaborative processing.  Crawley 
(2015) theorized that elaboration is affected by whether attention is focused on either 
internal or external stimuli.  Crawley mapped the two focuses of attention onto what are 
known as the narrative self and the momentary self.  The narrative self involves a focus 
on internal thoughts and elaborations on them, while the momentary self instead involves 
focusing on moment-to-moment experience without further elaboration.  It has been 
suggested that people naturally bias their attention internally on their narrative self.  
Mindfulness training and trait mindfulness are both believed to shift that bias toward the 
momentary self (Farb et al., 2007).  Such a shift moves a person’s attention away from 
internal thoughts to perceiving current experience, which may then inhibit elaborative 








Therefore, people who are high in dispositional mindfulness may focus more on 
perceiving current experience, which can include contextual information, than on their 
thoughts about that experience.  If that were the case, then changes in context would 
likely be experienced as distinct and one context would be unlikely to cue memory for 
another.  In the current dissertation, if the retrieval context during Test 2 does not cue that 
from Test 1, then memory for prior remembering should be impaired.  Rather than a 
benefit, mindfulness could instead have a negative association with memory for prior 
remembering, or no association at all (since the default finding is that memory for prior 
remembering is impaired by changes in context).  The semantic change condition in the 
present dissertation can be used to elucidate the effects that trait mindfulness has on 
semantic elaboration.  One goal of this dissertation was to explore whether memory for 
prior remembering operates on similar principles to memory for stimuli and events.  
Therefore, to better understand which outcome is predicted, it is necessary to understand 
how mindfulness relates to other factors that affect memory. 
There are two important ways in which mindfulness could indirectly impact 
memory: mindfulness is associated with hippocampal morphology (e.g., size and shape) 
and mindfulness improves attention.  The former is important for understanding how 
mindfulness affects brain areas that are important for memory formation and the latter 
reflects why I will argue that mindfulness is a trait that can be associated with attention to 
cognitions could underlie memory for prior remembering.  The discussion will first focus 
on the relationship between mindfulness and the hippocampus before shifting to 
attention.  Understanding effects on hippocampal morphology is important because the 








memories (Squire, 1992).  People who practice mindfulness have been shown to have 
greater gray matter volume in the right hippocampus compared to non-meditators (Hölzel 
et al., 2008).  It could be argued that the morphological changes in the hippocampus are 
not associated with the practice of mindfulness meditation, per se, but rather that people 
with larger hippocampi self-select into a mindful lifestyle.  This is unlikely, given that 
left hippocampal volume was found to be greater in a group of middle-aged adults that 
completed an eight-week mindfulness-based stress reduction course compared to a 
control group that did not practice meditation over the same period of time (Hölzel et al., 
2011).  It has also been demonstrated that meditation alters the functional activation of 
the hippocampus (Lazar et al., 2000).  Given that mediation is a key component of 
mindfulness training (Kabat-Zinn, 2003), it would follow that mindfulness training would 
also affect hippocampal function in the short-term.  These findings taken together suggest 
that there are both short- and long-term associations between mindfulness and the 
hippocampus. 
A second factor that likely underlies the relationship between mindfulness and 
memory performance is the association between mindfulness and attentional processes 
(Jha, Krompinger, & Baime, 2007; Ruocco & Direkoglu, 2013).  It is my argument that 
attention plays a major role in how we process our own cognitions, which I believe then 
underlies successful memory for prior remembering.  In general, greater attention is 
known to benefit memory performance (see Mulligan, 2008, for a review) and should 
also benefit memory for prior remembering.  Dispositional mindfulness may be one way 
of testing that argument because it has been associated with improvements in attentional 








mindfulness is associated with better performance on a variety of attentional tasks.  For 
example, dispositional mindfulness, as measured by the MAAS, has been positively 
correlated with measures of sustained attention on a GO/NOGO task (Mrazek, 
Smallwood, & Schooler, 2012).  GO/NOGO tasks require participants to respond to a 
frequently occurring stimulus (e.g., the letter “O”) while inhibiting their response to an 
infrequently occurring stimulus (e.g., the letter “Q”).  It has also been shown that 
mindfulness training improves performance on the emotional Stroop task, in which it is 
typically more difficult to name the color in which a negative valenced word is written 
than a neutral word.  Improved performance on the emotional Stroop task suggests that 
mindfulness is associated with heightened attention to primary task demands and that the 
natural inhibition caused by our highly learned reading behavior becomes less distracting 
(Lee & Orsillo, 2014). 
In other cases, the association between mindfulness and attention is unclear.  
Higher scores on the observing subscale of the FFMQ predict better alerting scores on the 
Attention Networks Test and higher scores on the acting with awareness subscale predict 
slower reaction times and worse orienting scores (Di Francesco, et al., 2017).  Those 
finding suggest that mindfulness can improve the ability to attend to external stimuli, but 
at the cost of being able to shift attention quickly.  That finding fits with Crawley’s 
(2015) argument that mindfulness is associated with an external attentional bias.  
However, some experiments have failed to find a relationship between a brief 
mindfulness training session and performance on an n-back working memory task, or the 
Trail Making Test.  Both the n-back and Trail Making Task are considered to be 








relationships between mindfulness and attention, it is my argument that mindfulness can 
be used as a measure of attentional processing that could predict the efficacy of memory 
for prior remembering. 
Despite the wide-ranging benefits of mindfulness on well-being and the 
relationships between mindfulness and other factors associated with memory that were 
just discussed, only recently have researchers begun to directly explore whether a 
relationship exists between mindfulness and performance on memory tasks.  These 
explorations have typically taken one of two approaches: using mindfulness training 
programs to directly examine effects of mindfulness on behavior and measuring 
mindfulness as a dispositional trait that can underlie behavior without training.  I will first 
discuss findings relating mindfulness training to memory before discussing how 
dispositional mindfulness relates to memory.  Researchers have examined the 
relationship between mindfulness training and memory using paradigms that vary in the 
duration of training and the type of memory test being used.  Mindfulness training often 
involves teaching participants how to perform directed body scans.  During a body scan, 
participants’ attention is drawn to bodily sensations and current thoughts, with instruction 
to withhold judgment on those perceptions (e.g., Bonamo, Legerski, & Thomas, 2015).  
This type of mindfulness training can involve as few as three minutes of recorded 
instructions, which has been shown to reduce false alarm rates on a recognition test, 
relative to listening to a documentary for the same duration (Lloyd, Szani, Rubenstein, 
Colgary, & Pereira-Pasarin, 2016).  The frequency with which participants can freely 
recall specific memories in response to emotional cue words on the Autobiographical 








following seven-weeks of a mindfulness training program compared to a 
demographically-matched control group that underwent no training (Heeren, Van Broeck, 
& Philippot, 2009).  Memory specificity refers to whether or not individual experiences 
can be reported in response to memory cues or if participants report general summaries of 
past experiences.  Specific memories are more detailed and contain more information 
than general memories.  Improved autobiographical memory specificity from pre- to 
post-test was also found in a population of formerly depressed participants who 
completed a mindfulness-based cognitive therapy program, while no improvement was 
found in a non-depressed control sample (Williams, Teasdale, Segal, & Soulsby, 2000). 
Mindfulness training has been shown to increase the proportion of remember 
responses that are scored as hits in the remember/know paradigm and to improve recall of 
information from a passage relative to a control condition (Brown, Goodman, Ryan, & 
Anālayo, 2016; but see Watier & Dubois, 2016, for evidence that training did not affect 
recognition accuracy).  Brown et al.’s (2016) results have interesting implications for 
how participants may perform on the memory for prior remembering task.  In a 
remember/know paradigm participants learn a set of stimuli, before being given a 
recognition test.  In addition to a recognition response, participants are also required to 
make a judgment about whether they “remember” the stimuli (i.e., they can recall specific 
details about the learning experience) or “know” that they learned the stimuli but do not 
have extra details to support that judgment.  It has been shown that recollection of 
contextual details is highly concurrent with the use of remember responses (McCabe, 








responses that participants give following mindfulness training seems to reflect better 
memory for contextual details.   
Mindfulness has also been related to with performance on tests of word recall.  
Memory for Swahili-English word pairs was better following a brief mindfulness training 
session that occurred immediately prior to recall than for a control group that was tested 
immediately (Bonamo et al., 2015).  Mindfulness training has also been shown to have 
effects on emotionally-valenced word recall.  Mindfulness training has been shown to 
increase positive word recall from pre- to post-training (Roberts-Wolfe, Sacchet, 
Hastings, Roth, & Britton, 2012) and others have found a lower proportion of negatively-
valenced word recall in a mindfulness training group relative to a control group (Alberts 
& Thewissen, 2011).  In both cases, there were no differences between groups in total 
recall.  It is important to note that mindfulness training can sometimes lead to increased 
recall of false memories.  Mindfulness training has been shown to increase the 
endorsement of critical lures in the DRM paradigm relative to control groups in multiple 
experiments (Rosenstreich, 2016; Wilson, Mickes, Stolarz-Fantino, Evrard, & Fantino, 
2015). 
Researchers have also examined the relationships between mindfulness as a 
dispositional trait and memory.  Dispositional mindfulness is defined as the tendency to 
behave in a more or less mindful way in everyday life (Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007).  
Researchers have looked for associations between dispositional mindfulness and memory 
using mindfulness questionnaires like the MAAS and the FFMQ.  In the Bonamo et al. 
(2015) experiment, mentioned previously, no relationship was found between scores on 








had on recall of English-Swahili word pairs.  Other researchers have also failed to find a 
relationship between scores on the FFMQ and memory.  One such study explored how 
dispositional mindfulness, measured using the FFMQ, was associated with recognition 
memory.  Rosenstreich and Ruderman (2016) compared participants’ hit rates to their 
false alarm rates to assess the association between mindfulness and participants’ ability to 
discriminate between new and old items.  In a recognition memory experiment, a hit is a 
correct identification of a previously studied item as old and a false alarm is an incorrect 
identification of a new item as old.  Rosenstreich and Ruderman (2016) used the term 
sensitivity to describe their measure (though it was calculated the same way as 
discrimination, d’), which they did not find to be associated with dispositional 
mindfulness.  Their results suggested that dispositional mindfulness does not improve 
recognition memory performance.  The lack of evidence to support a relationship 
between dispositional mindfulness and memory is in stark contrast to the positive effects 
that mindfulness training has on memory. 
Other evidence suggests that the relationship between mindfulness and memory is 
less clear.  The experiment by Brown et al. (2016), which was mentioned previously, 
failed to find a relationship between scores on the FFMQ and performance on the 
remember/know paradigm, but did find a positive association between state mindfulness 
(measured using the MAAS) and the proportion of remember responses that were scored 
as hits.  In other words, people who were in a mindful state (as a result of training or 
assessment of current mental state) were shown to have better memory than those who 
were not in a mindful state.  Lykins, Baer, and Gottlieb (2012) found that long-term 








Test (CVLT) than a non-meditating control sample.  The CVLT is a word list recall test 
which contains subscales for long- and short-delay retention intervals, as well as free and 
cued-recall.  Even though mindfulness meditators scored higher on the FFMQ than non-
meditators, no association was made between scores on the FFMQ and the CVLT.  
Dispositional mindfulness, measured using the Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory (Walach, 
Buchheld, Buttenmuller, Kleinknecht, & Schmidt, 2006), has been found to be negatively 
correlated with autobiographical memory specificity (Crawley, 2015), but there was a 
positive correlation between mindfulness and the intensity of emotional recall 
experiences.  The Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory measures mindful actions like 
presence and acceptance, which are similar to the FFMQ measures of observing and 
nonjudgment of thoughts and feelings, respectively. 
Current research evidence suggests that the relationship between dispositional 
mindfulness and memory needs to be better defined.  In some cases dispositional 
mindfulness has shown no relationship with memory, in others the relationship is 
unknown (e.g., free recall, false memory endorsement), and others have found a positive 
association.  It is likely the case that how dispositional mindfulness is being measured 
underlies any associations with memory.  Though the FFMQ and the MAAS both purport 
to measure mindfulness, the two measures focus on different aspects of the trait and there 
is a critical distinction between the two.  The MAAS focuses on the attentional aspects of 
mindfulness, while the FFMQ measures mindfulness as a broad set of skills, of which 
attention is only one aspect of mindfully acting with awareness.  Because I am 
specifically arguing that the role mindfulness plays in memory could be a product of 








clarify the association between mindfulness and memory by exploring whether 
dispositional levels of mindful attention are associated with cued-recall and memory for 
prior remembering.  
Based on the research that has been discussed, it is my argument that individual 
differences in dispositional mindfulness could be used to measure internally-focused 
attention on cognition.  In particular, focusing on one’s own cognitions may improve 
memory for prior remembering and that focus comes from attentional processing.  
Focusing attention on either internal thoughts could lead to elaboration and an increase in 
associations between a current cognition and previous experience.  This is a novel 
application of Crawley’s (2015) idea that dispositional mindfulness is related to 
differences in internal and external attentional control.  To find a relationship between 
mindfulness and memory for prior remembering, it is important to use an appropriate 
measure of mindfulness. 
Currently there are competing theories concerning the relationship between 
mindfulness and semantic elaboration and this dissertation can provide support for one 
theory or the other.  Finding that higher levels of mindfulness are associated with better 
memory for prior remembering would support the theory that mindfulness can allow 
people to have better access to their network of semantic information and, as a result, 
better memory.  Alternatively, finding that mindfulness has no association with memory 
for prior remembering or is associated with greater impairment would support the theory 
that mindfulness can manifest as greater external attention to present moment 
circumstances and an inhibition of internal processing.  I tested the association between 








described in the previous section about context change (semantic change, background 
change, and location change).  Mindfulness was assessed using the MAAS, which was 
given during the retention interval of the memory for prior remembering paradigm 
adapted from Leppanen and Lyle (2018).  To keep the discussion of predicted outcomes 
for both of the individual difference measures clearer, hypotheses for how dispositional 
mindfulness was expected to be associated with memory for prior remembering will be 
discussed in the general summary section. 
 Absorption 
The second individual difference factor that I argue could predict memory for 
prior remembering is absorption (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974).  Absorption is defined as 
“a disposition for having episodes of ‘total’ attention that fully engage one’s 
representational resources” and is most often measured using the Tellegen Absorption 
Scale (TAS, Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974, p. 268).  Measuring participants’ absorption will 
allow me to further test my idea that individual differences in internally-focused 
cognition affect memory for prior remembering.  Absorption has received considerable 
attention in the literature for its association with hypnotic susceptibility (e.g., Nadon, 
Hoyt, Register, & Kihlstrom, 1991; Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974), but it has also been 
associated with memory and attentional processes.  Absorption has also frequently been 
associated with other personality traits.  People who score high on absorption measures 
also tend to score high on tests of traits like fantasy proneness (see Lynn & Rhue, 1988 
for a summary of findings), visual imagery and vividness of visual imagery (Pekala, 
Wenger, & Levine, 1985), hypnotizability (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974), fantastical 








absorption has with other traits that involve high levels of internal focus, it was measured 
to assess whether internally-guided attention is associated with memory for prior 
remembering.  
Although mindfulness and absorption were both measured in this dissertation to 
explore whether individual differences in how people focus on their own cognitions 
affect memory for prior remembering, the two traits may reflect different types of focus.  
Greater focus on one’s cognitions may lead to stronger memory for those cognitions.  I 
argued that mindfulness may play an important role in that process because of the 
association mindfulness has with attention (e.g., Jha et al., 2007).  Similarly, absorption 
has been shown to be associated with attentional processes.  People who score high in 
absorption also score high on measures of self-focused attention (Perona-Garcelán, et al., 
2013), meaning they can become highly focused on themselves, rather than external 
experiences.  In contrast to highly-mindful individuals, people who are high in absorption 
may focus their attention on elaborating about their own thoughts rather than noticing 
them and letting them pass.  Intense focus on cognitive processing could be why people 
who are high in absorption are more susceptible to inattentional blindness (Richards, 
Hellgren, & French, 2014), or the failure to notice a stimulus when a concurrent task also 
demands attention.  People who are high in absorption may have their behavior guided 
less by external attention to stimuli and more by their own internal cognitions.  Intense 
focus on one’s cognitions could also be why absorption has been positively correlated 
with procrastination (Sirois, 2014).  Sirois conceptualized procrastination as a focus of 








suggests that absorption can manifest as focused attention on current experience without 
respect to other points in time.   
The results just presented support my argument that absorption is associated with 
periods of highly-focused attention on internal thought, which could impact memory for 
prior remembering.  People who are highly absorbed in their current thoughts about a 
given task may elaborate more on the stimuli that are being learned and relate them 
previous experience.  If that were the case, absorption would positively predict memory 
for prior remembering.  Participants who think a lot about changed-context targets may 
come across the previous thoughts about those targets.  It would then be more likely for 
the Test 2 retrieval context to cue the Test 1 retrieval context and improve memory for 
prior remembering.  Alternatively, as with mindfulness, it could be the case that 
absorption harms memory for prior remembering.  Participants who are high in 
absorption may instead focus on each individual retrieval context and focus deeply on 
that specific information without thinking about it relates to their previous experience 
during Test 1.  In that situation, there would instead be a reduced likelihood that the Test 
2 retrieval context would cue that from Test 1 and memory for prior remembering and 
people who are high in absorption would show greater impairment than people who are 
low in absorption.  To have a better understanding of which outcome is more likely, the 
discussion will now focus on the relationships that have already been found between 
absorption and memory. 
Associations between absorption and memory for stimuli can be used to develop 
hypotheses about how absorption could affect memory for prior remembering.  For 








following examples) have been shown to have a greater propensity to accept false 
information about the peripheral details of a staged classroom event than people who are 
low in absorption (Eisen & Carlson, 1998).  It has also been shown that participants who 
scored higher on absorption were more likely to have a distorted memory for how they 
learned about a highly publicized event (i.e., the O.J. Simpson trial verdict).  In the same 
sample, no relationship was found between absorption and false retrieval of critical lures 
on the DRM (Platt, Lacy, Iobst, and Finkelman, 1998).  Those two findings suggest that 
absorption could be associated with embellishing or otherwise accepting new details 
about autobiographical events, but that same type of updating does not occur with verbal 
stimuli in a laboratory setting.  However, absorption has not always been associated with 
more frequently reports of false memories.  Participants who scored higher and those who 
scored low in absorption were equally likely to falsely endorse journal entries that they 
had not written as a previously retrieved memories (Horselenberg, Merckelbach, van 
Breukelen, & Wessel, 2004).  There is also no evidence to suggest that people who are 
higher in absorption are more likely to create false memories for suggested childhood 
experiences than participants lower in absorption (Hyman & Billings, 1998).  These 
results demonstrate that further research is needed to clarify the relationship between 
absorption and false memories. 
Absorption has also been associated with memory in people who have highly-
superior autobiographical memory (HSAM).  People with HSAM have highly detailed 
memories for autobiographical events.  For example, they perform better than control 
participants on the 10-dates questionnaire, which asks participants to recite which day of 








have occurred on that date (LePort et al., 2012).  It has been proposed that people with 
HSAM have such good memory because deeper attentional processing of, or absorption 
in, events allows information to be related to oneself and people with HSAM engage in 
that form of processing more than the average person (Patihis, 2016).  In one study, 
people with HSAM were found to have higher absorption scores than control participants 
and people with HSAM were shown to have a higher propensity to accept misinformation 
than control participants.  In that study, controlling for absorption eliminated the 
difference between people with HSAM and controls in their overall number of reported 
false memories in a misinformation paradigm (Patihis et al., 2013).  Despite having 
highly accurate autobiographical memory, people with HSAM still attend to and accept 
misinformation, much like the results of the previously discussed experiments with 
participants who could be assumed to have average memory ability.  Therefore, it seems 
to be the case that regardless of baseline memory, people who are high in absorption are 
more accepting of false information into memory. 
Absorption has also been associated with memory distortions, which has 
implications for how absorption may affect memory for prior remembering.  A positive 
correlation has been found between absorption and both the number and frequency of 
memory distortions (Platt et al., 1998).  This is relevant to memory for prior remembering 
because one way in which memories can be distorted is through the acceptance of new 
information (e.g., Belli, 1989).  It could be the case that a memory distortion caused by 
the acceptance of new information does not only cause memory distortions, but also 
allows for new associations to be formed.  This idea is relevant to the current discussion 








during Test 1 improved their memory for prior remembering of changed-context targets 
(Leppanen & Lyle, 2018).  We argued that this was because reminding allowed 
participants to form an association between the target, the learning context, and the Test 1 
retrieval context.  That association could only be formed if information about the learning 
context was brought back to mind and added to the experience of the Test 1 retrieval 
context.   
Because reminding improves memory for prior remembering, it can be argued 
that accepting new information into a recently retrieved memory has beneficial effects.  If 
people who are high in absorption are more likely to accept new information, then they 
may also be more likely to accept a spontaneous reminder of a previous memory into a 
new experience.  In other words, participants who are high in absorption may be more 
likely to incorporate the study context into their memory for the act of Test 1 retrieval, 
regardless of a context change.  What that would mean, is that for changed-context 
targets, the Test 2 retrieval context (which is identical to the study context) would be 
more likely to cue the Test 1 retrieval context and memory for prior remembering would 
be improved. 
This dissertation explored whether absorption can predict memory for prior 
remembering.  Even though previous researchers have frequently used the TAS, I used an 
updated version of the TAS.  The modified Tellegen Absorption Scale (MODTAS, 
Jamieson, 2005) has stronger inter-scale correlations between the measure’s separate 
subscales than the original TAS and all of the subscales were found to significantly load 








me to provide empirical support for whether highly-focused attention on internal thoughts 
is associated with participants’ ability to remember prior instances of memory retrieval. 
Conclusions 
The previous three sections have discussed the impact of individual differences on 
cognition, with an emphasis on memory and attentional processes.  Currently, little is 
known about individual differences in the accuracy of memory for prior remembering.  
The individual differences that were measured in this dissertation were selected to 
address my idea that individual differences in how people process their own cognitions 
affect how well those cognitions are remembered.  To date, researchers have only shown 
that cognitive failures (as measured by the CFQ) are positively correlated with a 
difference score that represents the accuracy of memory for prior remembering.  
Throughout the previous two sections I have attempted to establish a connection between 
individual differences that are associated with internally-guided attention and memory for 
prior remembering.  I have argued that attentional processes, which affect the encoding of 
stimuli, also affect the encoding of instances of memory retrieval.  It is also likely that 
attention paid to cognitive processing can lead to elaboration of that processing which 
can produce more associations between a given cognitive operation and previous 
experience.  In this dissertation internally-focused attention was measured as 
dispositional mindfulness and absorption.  Both dispositional mindfulness and absorption 
have been found to have associations with memory and attentional processes.  By relating 
scores on the MAAS and the MODTAS to memory for prior remembering of both same-








for how attention to and elaboration on cognitions can affect later memory for those 
cognitions. 
 The second research question of interest was whether individual differences in 
internally-guided attention, which were measured using the MAAS and the MODTAS, 
could predict memory for prior remembering.  To answer that question, memory for prior 
remembering was measured using an adapted version of paradigm used by Leppanen and 
Lyle (2018).  The proportion of correct judgments of prior remembering were related to 
scores on the MAAS and the MODTAS.  If you recall, in this paradigm, participants 
studied cue-target pairings and were subsequently given two cued-recall tests for the 
targets.  Critically, after the second cued-recall test participants were asked to make 
judgments about their prior remembering.  Participants were required to indicate whether 
they believed they retrieved each target during the first cued-recall test or not.  Aside 
from the context manipulations previously discussed, the second novel contribution of 
this dissertation was to assess whether scores on the MAAS and the MODTAS could 
predict memory for prior remembering.  If any associations exist between internally-
guided attention and memory for prior remembering, the design of this dissertation 
allowed me to test whether any predictive power could be generalized across multiple 
types of context (semantic, background color, and screen location) or whether predictive 
power differs based on the type of contextual change. 
Previous researchers have suggested that internally-guided attention can either 
improve (Rosenstreich, 2016) or impair (Crawley, 2015) the elaboration of stimuli – at 
least when theories focus on the attentional aspects of mindfulness – which could 








hypothesized that memory for prior remembering would be negatively predicted by total 
MAAS scores following all three types of contextual change.  Previous research suggests 
that participants who focus on present retrieval contexts without respect to past contexts 
should show poorer memory for prior remembering of changed-context targets than 
participants who focus more on their own cognitions.  I also hypothesized that there will 
be no association between dispositional mindfulness and memory for prior remembering 
of same-context targets.  Conversely, I hypothesized that memory for prior remembering 
would be positively predicted by scores on the MODTAS in all three contextual change 
conditions.  If people who are absorbed attend to the stimuli they are learning on a deeper 
level and relate those stimuli to previous experience, then they would be expected to have 
access to a wider array of retrieval cues, which would be expected to improve memory 
for prior remembering.  Such a process would only be expected to benefit memory for 
prior remembering of changed-context targets because memory for prior remembering of 
same-context targets is typically near ceiling (e.g., Arnold & Lindsay, 2002; Leppanen & 
Lyle, 2018).  As such, I hypothesized that memory for prior remembering of same-
context targets would not be predicted by scores on the MODTAS in any condition.  It is 
also of interest whether mindfulness and absorption measure similar constructs or if the 
two traits represent distinct ways of focusing on experience.  As such, scores on the 
MAAS and the MODTAS were correlated with one another.  I hypothesized that scores 
on the MAAS and the MODTAS would be positively correlated, given that an association 
between scores on the original TAS and some subscales on the FFMQ has previously 












Participants and Design 
 Undergraduate students (N = 180; 117 female; aged 18-30 years, M = 20) 
participated for course credit.  Sixty participants were in each of three conditions.  All 
participants completed the MAAS and the MODTAS.  This dissertation had a 2 (Test 1 
context: same versus changed) × 3 (Change type: semantic, background, location) mixed-
factorial design, with Test 1 context as the between subjects factor and change type as the 
within-subjects factor.  Memory for prior remembering (measured as the proportion of 
correct judgments of memory for prior remembering for same-context and changed-
context targets following in each change condition) was regressed on total scores on the 
MAAS and total scores on the MODTAS to measure individual difference effects. 
Materials 
 Study materials consisted of 113 homographic target words (selection criteria can 
be found in Arnold & Lindsay, 2002).  Four words served as primacy buffers and four 
served as recency buffers, leaving 105 critical targets for analysis.  Since each target was 
a homograph, two possible cues were used which corresponded to two possible meanings 
of the target (e.g., hand and tree were cues for the target palm).  Study lists were created 
by counterbalancing the pairing of each target with each of the two possible cues such 
that each cue served as the study cue equally often across conditions.  Test lists were 








treatments: tested with the same context as study (same-context targets), tested with the 
other possible context (changed-context targets), and not tested.  The counterbalancing of 
test lists was based on assigning specific cue-target pairings from the study phase into 
each treatment.  This means that the type of change (semantic, background color, or 
screen location) did not affect which cue-target pairings were assigned to which 
treatment.  For example, hand – palm was a studied cue-target pairing in the same-
context treatment, the other context treatment, and the not tested treatment an equal 
amount of times, irrespective of what type of change occurred.  Each target was tested in 
the study context on Test 2, regardless of Test 1 treatment. 
MAAS 
 Individual differences in dispositional mindfulness were measured using the 
MAAS (Brown & Ryan, 2003).  The MAAS is a 15-item questionnaire which asks 
participants to rate how often they experience certain events, such as, “I find it difficult to 
stay focused on what’s happening in the present”, on a 6-point Likert-type scale (1 = 
Almost always to 6 = Almost Never).  Ratings for all items were averaged together to 
obtain a mindfulness score which could range from 1 to 6.  Higher scores indicated 
higher levels of dispositional mindfulness. 
MODTAS 
 Individual differences in absorption were assessed using the MODTAS 
(Jamieson, 2005).  The MODTAS is a 34-item questionnaire which asks participants to 
rate their agreement with a series of statements, such as, “When I listen to music, I get so 
caught up in it that I don’t notice anything else”, on a 5-point Likert-type scale (0 = Never 








absorption as a single construct and not to analyze the individual subscales separately 
(e.g., Horselenberg, et al., 2004; Platt et al., 1998; Sirois, 2014).  As such, ratings for all 
items were summed together to obtain a single absorption score.  Scores could range 
from 0 to 136, with higher scores indicating higher levels of absorption. 
Procedure 
 The same three-step procedure, modeled after Arnold and Lindsay (2002), was 
used for each type of contextual change.  The first phase of the procedure was the study 
phase.  The second and third phases were both cued-recall tests, separated by a retention 
interval.  Each phase is described in more detail below. 
Participants were tested in groups of up to five on individual computers in a 
laboratory testing room using E-Prime 2.0 software.  The procedure used in this 
dissertation followed that of Leppanen and Lyle (2018), which differed from that of 
Arnold and Lindsay (2002), in that participants completed the experiment individually on 
a computer without an experimenter to record recall responses, nor was there auditory 
recording of responses. 
 Study Phase  
Following informed consent participants began the study phase of the experiment.  
In each condition, participants read the same study instructions.  Participants were asked 
to attend to each cue-target pairing and learn that they go together.  Participants were 
instructed to study the series of cue-target word pairs because their memory for them 
would be tested later.  In the study phase, participants in all conditions viewed the same 
105 critical cue-target word pairs (e.g., hand-palm, dog-bark), preceded by four primacy 








homographic target was paired with one of two possible cues (e.g., palm could be cued 
by either hand or tree).  Critical cue-target pairs were presented in a new random order 
for each participant.  In the semantic change and background change conditions, each 
study trial began with a cue-target pairing in the center of a white screen, in black font, 
for 2000 ms.  In the location change condition all of the study pairs were presented at the 
top of the computer screen (centered, 10% below the top edge of the screen).  Cue-target 
pairs were then replaced with a sentence, in the same location as the cue-target pairing, 
containing the cue word and three asterisks which represented the point in the sentence in 
which the target would logically go (e.g., He used the *** of his hand to swat a fly, for 
the target word palm).  The sentence appeared on the screen alone for 3500 ms and then 
the target word appeared above the sentence for an additional 1000 ms.   As such, each 
study trial lasted 6500 ms.  Study trials were separated by a 1000 ms inter-trial interval. 
Test 1 Phase 
Immediately following the study phase, participants began the Test 1 phase.  Test 
1 was a self-paced, cued-recall test.  For each Test 1 trial, a cue word and a partially 
completed target, word consisting of the first and last letters of a studied target separated 
by dashes (e.g., hand – p _ _ m), were presented on the screen.  Participants were 
instructed to type the entire target word rather than typing only the missing letters.  
During Test 1, targets were assigned to one of three treatments: tested in the study 
context (same-context targets), tested in a new context (changed-context targets), or not 
tested (not tested targets).  In the semantic change condition, same-context targets were 
those that were paired with the study cue, while changed-context targets were those that 








had not been studied previously.  Unlike the semantic change condition, cue-target 
pairings in the background and location change conditions remained the same throughout 
the study.  In the background change condition, same-context targets were presented in 
black font on the same white background as the study phase, while changed-context 
targets were presented in black font on a yellow background.  In the location change 
condition, same-context targets were presented at the top of the screen, while changed-
context targets were presented at the bottom of the screen (centered, 20% from the 
bottom of the screen to allow for the response box to be located below the stimuli in both 
treatments).  Participants were instructed to respond with a target they remembered 
viewing during the study phase and to respond with “pass” if they were unable to recall a 
target from the study phase.  Participants were given an example of how to respond.  On 
each trial, participants were given feedback on whether they were correct or incorrect.  
There was a seven-minute retention interval following Test 1, during which time 
participants completed the MAAS and the MODTAS.  The order in which the two 
questionnaires were completed was counterbalanced and achieved by stapling the 
questionnaires in one of the two possible orders. 
 Test 2 Phase 
Test 2 was a second cued-recall test.  Participants were informed that all of the 
words from the study phase would be tested in the same context they were viewed in 
during the study phase (i.e., original study cues for all targets in the semantic change 
condition, white background for all targets in the background change condition, and all 
targets were presented at the top of the screen in the location change condition).  








during the study phase.  Following each cued-recall attempt, participants were also asked 
to make a judgment of their prior remembering.  Participants were asked: “Did you 
retrieve this target during the first test?  Yes (y) or No (n)”.  Participants were instructed 
to make their judgment irrespective of the context in which the target appeared during 
Test 1.  If a participant remembered seeing “incorrect” as feedback after attempting to 
retrieve a target on Test 1, or if they remembered responding with “pass”, they were 
instructed to make the judgment that the target had not been previously retrieved.  After 












Context Effect Analyses 
 The first aim of this dissertation was to test whether changing contextual features 
other than the semantic context would impair memory for prior remembering.  Even 
though the focus of this dissertation is on accuracy of memory for prior remembering, 
cued-recall performance was also analyzed (e.g., Arnold & Lindsay, 2002; Leppanen & 
Lyle, 2018). 
Context Effects on Cued Recall 
Cued-recall performance on Test 1 was calculated as the proportion of correct 
target retrievals (see Table 1).  Performance was analyzed using a 2 (Test 1 context: same 
or changed) × 3 (change type: semantic, background, location) mixed-factorial ANOVA, 
with Test 1 context as the within-subjects variable and change type as the between-
subjects variable.  The main effect of Test 1 context was significant, showing that cued-
recall of targets on Test 1 was greater for same-context targets (M = .79) than changed-
context targets (M = .75), F(1, 177) = 25.03, p < .001, ηp2 = .124.  There was also a 
significant main effect of change type, F(2, 177) = 7.02, p = .001, ηp2 = .074.  Follow-up 
independent samples t tests revealed that participants in the semantic change condition 
recalled a significantly lower proportion of targets on Test 1 (M = .72) than participants 
in the background change (M = .79) or the location change (M = .80) conditions, smallest 








background or location change conditions.  The main effects were qualified by a 
significant interaction, F(2, 177) = 23.89, p < .001, ηp2 = .213.  The interaction was 
explored with follow-up paired-samples t tests for each change type separately.  In the 
semantic change condition, same-context target retrieval on Test 1 (M = .78) was 
significantly better than changed-context target retrieval (M = .66), t(59) = 7.39, p < .001 
, d = .974.  In contrast, same-context target retrieval and changed-context target retrieval 
on Test 1 did not differ in either the background change or location change condition, 
smallest p = .910 (see Figure 1). 
Table 1 
Proportion of Targets Recalled Correctly Across Change Type 
 
                   Change Type 
 
 Semantic Background Location 
Test 1 Same-Context .78 (.02) .79 (.02) .80 (.02) 
Test 1 Changed-Context .66 (.02) .79 (.02) .80 (.02) 
Test 2 Same-Context .83 (.02) .83 (.02) .84 (.02) 
Test 2 Changed-Context .82 (.02) .83 (.02) .84 (.02) 
Test 2 Not Tested .80 (.02) .80 (.02) .79 (.02) 









Figure 1. Proportion correct target recall on Test 1.  Error bars represent one standard 
error of the mean. 
 
Cued-recall performance on Test 2 was calculated as the proportion of correct 
target retrievals.  The proportion of targets retrieved correctly was analyzed using a 3 
(Test 1 context: same, changed, or not tested) × 3 (change type: semantic, background, 
location) mixed-factorial ANOVA, with Test 1 context as a within-subjects factor and 
change type as a between-subjects factor.  The main effect of Test 1 context was 
significant, F(2, 176) = 21.80, p < .001, ηp2 = .199.  There was no significant interaction 
between Test 1 context and change type (p = .666).  The main effect of Test 1 context 
was explored with follow-up paired-samples t tests comparing the proportion of correct 
recall of same-, changed-, and not tested targets to each other across the three types of 











































context targets (M = .83), but not tested targets (M = .79) were recalled significantly less 
often than either previously tested cue type, smallest t(179) = 5.55, p < .001, d = .32 (see 
Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Proportion correct target recall on Test 2.  Error bars represent one standard 
error of the mean. 
  
Context Effects on Memory for Prior Remembering 
 Memory for prior remembering analyses were run contingent upon correct target 
retrieval on both Test 1 and Test 2 (e.g., Arnold & Lindsay, 2002; Leppanen & Lyle, 
2018).  Accurate memory for prior remembering was defined as a “yes” judgment to the 
memory for prior remembering probe following cued-recall attempts on Test 2 (“Did you 
retrieve this target on the first test?”).  Tables 2-4 show the proportion (and raw number) 











































for prior remembering probe on Test 2.  The proportion of correct judgments of memory 
for prior remembering was analyzed using a 2 (Test 1 context: same or changed) X 3 
(change type: semantic, background, location) mixed-factorial ANOVA, with Test 1 
context as a within-subjects factor and change type as a between-subjects factor.  The 
main effect of Test 1 context (see Figure 3) was significant, F(1, 177) = 85.20, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .325.  A follow-up paired-samples t test revealed that the accuracy of memory for 
prior remembering of same-context targets (M = .91) was significantly higher than that of 
changed-context targets (M = .82), t(179) = 6.50, p < .001, d = .48.  However, this main 
effect was qualified by a significant interaction with change type, F(2, 177) = 91.97, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .510.  To explore the interaction, separate paired-samples t tests were run for 
each change type separately (semantic, background, location).  In the semantic change 
condition, accuracy of memory for prior remembering of same-context targets (M = .91) 
was significantly higher than that of changed-context targets (M = .63), t(59) = 10.33, p < 
.001, d = 1.47.  In the background change condition, accuracy of memory for prior 
remembering of same-context targets (M = .92) did not significantly differ from that of 
changed-context targets (M = .91), p = .124.  In the location change condition, the pattern 
of results was opposite that of the semantic change condition.  Accuracy of memory for 
prior remembering of changed-context targets (M = .92) was significantly higher than 













Mean Number of Targets and Mean Proportion of Targets Judged as “recalled” as a 
Function of Recall Status on Test 1 for the Semantic Change Condition 
 
Test 1/Test 2  
Recall Status 
Number of  
Targets 
Proportion Judged as 
“recalled” on Test 1 
 
 Same cue*  
Recalled/Recalled 26.27 .91 (.01) 
Recalled/Not Recalled 1.15 .61 (.07) 
Not Recalled/Not Recalled 4.93 .22 (.04) 
Not Recalled/Recalled 2.65 .53 (.06) 
 Changed cue*  
Recalled/Recalled 20.25 .63 (.03) 
Recalled/Not Recalled 2.78 .33 (.06) 
Not Recalled/Not Recalled 3.43 .21 (.04) 
Not Recalled/Recalled 8.43 .37 (.05) 
 Not tested*  
NA/Recalled 27.88 .36 (.04) 
NA/Not Recalled 7.12 .15 (.03) 
NA = Not applicable. * Test 1 context.  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of the 
















Table 3  
 
Mean Number of Targets and Mean Proportion of Targets Judged as “recalled” as a 
Function of Recall Status on Test 1 for the Background Change Condition 
 
 
Test 1/Test 2  
Recall Status 
Number of  
Targets 
Proportion Judged as 
“recalled” on Test 1 
 
 Same cue*  
Recalled/Recalled 26.57 .92 (.01) 
Recalled/Not Recalled 1.18 .66 (.07) 
Not Recalled/Not Recalled 4.73 .28 (.05) 
Not Recalled/Recalled 2.52 .53 (.05) 
 Changed cue*  
Recalled/Recalled 26.68 .91 (.01) 
Recalled/Not Recalled 1.03 .52 (.08) 
Not Recalled/Not Recalled 4.90 .27 (.05) 
Not Recalled/Recalled 2.38 .55 (.06) 
 Not tested*  
NA/Recalled 27.83 .34 (.04) 
NA/Not Recalled 7.17 .15 (.03) 
NA = Not applicable. * Test 1 context.  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of the 


















Mean Number of Targets and Mean Proportion of Targets Judged as “recalled” as a 
Function of Recall Status on Test 1 for the Location Change Condition 
 
 
Test 1/Test 2  
Recall Status 
Number of  
Targets 
Proportion Judged as 
“recalled” on Test 1 
 
 Same cue*  
Recalled/Recalled 26.90 .90 (.01) 
Recalled/Not Recalled 1.05 .55 (.07) 
Not Recalled/Not Recalled 4.60 .21 (.04) 
Not Recalled/Recalled 2.45 .44 (.05) 
 Changed cue*  
Recalled/Recalled 26.83 .92 (.01) 
Recalled/Not Recalled 1.07 .56 (.07) 
Not Recalled/Not Recalled 4.63 .23 (.04) 
Not Recalled/Recalled 2.47 .54 (.05) 
 Not tested*  
NA/Recalled 27.63 .34 (.04) 
NA/Not Recalled 7.37 .13 (.03) 
NA = Not applicable. * Test 1 context.  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of the 








Figure 3. Proportion correct judgments of memory for prior remembering across the three 
change types.  Judgments were only analyzed for targets which were correctly retrieved 
on both Test 1 and Test 2. Errors bars represent one standard error of the mean.  
 
 I also examined if the accuracy of memory for prior remembering of changed-
context targets differed between the three change types.  Independent-samples t tests 
revealed that accuracy of memory for prior remembering of changed-context targets was 
significantly worse following a change in semantic context (M = .63), than following 
either of the other two change types (Ms = .91 and .92, for the background change and 
location change conditions, respectively), smallest t(118) = 8.04, p < .001, d = 1.52.  
Accuracy of memory for prior remembering of changed-context targets did not 

















































Individual Difference Analyses 
 The second aim of this dissertation was to explore if dispositional mindfulness 
and absorption could predict memory for prior remembering.  Neither scores on the 
MAAS, nor scores on the MODTAS differed as a function of questionnaire order, 
smallest p = .293, and as such, all analyses were collapsed across order.  The correlation 
between scores on the MAAS (M = 53.3) and scores on the MODTAS (M = 60.8) did not 
reach the cutoff of statistical significance, r = -.14, p = .063. 
Correlations between Cued Recall, Memory for Prior Remembering, scores on the 
MAAS, and scores on the MODTAS 
 Pearson’s correlations were calculated between the individual difference measures 
(MAAS and MODTAS scores) and the dependent variables.  From Test 1, the proportion 
of correct same- and changed-context target retrieval were included.  From Test 2, the 
proportion of correct same- and changed-context target retrieval, and the proportion of 
correct not tested target retrieval were included.  The proportion of correct judgments of 
memory for prior remembering for same- and changed-context targets were also 
included.  Finally, a contextual change difference score was added to the correlation 
analyses.  Contextual change difference scores were calculated by subtracting the 
proportion of correct judgments of memory for prior remembering for changed-context 
targets from that of same-context targets.  Contextual change difference scores were 
added to assess the effect of contextual change on memory for prior remembering while 
accounting for baseline memory performance.  Full correlation matrices can be found in 








Across all three types of change, an expected positive correlation was found 
between all of the cued-recall measures, smallest r = .35, p = .007.  The only significant 
correlation between cued-recall and memory for prior remembering was found in the 
background color condition.  In the background condition, the proportion of changed-
context targets that were retrieved on Test 1 was negatively correlated with the contextual 
change difference score, r = -.27, p = .041.  There were also significant positive 
correlations between the proportion of correct judgments of memory for prior 
remembering for same- and changed-context targets in all three conditions, smallest r = 
.61, p < .001.  The only significant correlations between the individual difference 
measures and accuracy of memory for prior remembering were found in the semantic 
change condition.  In the semantic change condition, there was a significant positive 
correlation between MODTAS scores and the proportion of correct memory for prior 
remembering judgments of same-context targets, r = .29, p = .026.  There was also a 
significant positive correlation between MODTAS scores and the proportion of correct 





Table 5  
Correlation Matrix for the Semantic Change Condition 










Note: MPR = proportion correct judgments of memory for prior remembering. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Total MAAS –          
2 Total MODTAS .05 –         
3 Test 1 Same-Context 
Cued Recall 
-.11 -.12 –        
4 Test 1 Changed-
Context Cued Recall 
.07 -.06 .47*** –       
5 Test 2 Same-Context 
Cued Recall 
-.18 .09 .85*** .42*** –      
6 Test 2 Changed-
Context Cued Recall 
-.12 .01 .66*** .46*** .69*** –     
7 Test 2 Not Tested 
Cued Recall 
-.32* .14 .57*** .35** .69*** .78*** –    
8 Same-context MPR .06 .29* .13 .02 .24 .09 .07 –   
9 Changed-Context 
MPR 
.07 .27* .01 -.04 .05 -.11 -.09 .61*** –  
10 Contextual Change 
Difference Score 
-.06 -.20 .05 .05 .04 .17 .14 -.30* -.94*** – 





Correlation Matrix for the Background Color Change Condition 










Note: MPR = proportion correct judgments of memory for prior remembering. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Total MAAS –          
2 Total MODTAS -.31 –         
3 Test 1 Same-Context 
Cued Recall 
.06 -.08 –        
4 Test 1 Changed-
Context Cued Recall 
-.06 -.11 .73*** –       
5 Test 2 Same-Context 
Cued Recall 
-.06 -.10 .90*** .72*** –      
6 Test 2 Changed-
Context Cued Recall 
.01 -.12 .66*** .89*** .69*** –     
7 Test 2 Not Tested 
Cued Recall 
.05 -.27* .72*** .75** .74*** .74*** –    
8 Same-context MPR -.05 .07 -.04 -.2 -.08 -.18 -.23 –   
9 Changed-Context 
MPR 
-.11 -.03 .08 < .01 .06 .06 -.06 .73*** –  
10 Contextual Change 
Difference Score 





Correlation Matrix for the Screen Location Change Condition 










Note: MPR = proportion correct judgments of memory for prior remembering. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Total MAAS –          
2 Total MODTAS -.14 –         
3 Test 1 Same-Context 
Cued Recall 
-.02 -.22 –        
4 Test 1 Changed-
Context Cued Recall 
.04 -.20 .75*** –       
5 Test 2 Same-Context 
Cued Recall 
.09 -.16 .91*** .77*** –      
6 Test 2 Changed-
Context Cued Recall 
.11 -.17 .70*** .92*** .76*** –     
7 Test 2 Not Tested 
Cued Recall 
.10 -.13 .73*** .76** .79*** .78*** –    
8 Same-context MPR .10 .06 .14 .01 .12 -.04 .09 –   
9 Changed-Context 
MPR 
.12 .07 -.02 -.03 < .01 -.08 -.08 .66*** –  
10 Contextual Change 
Difference Score 








Predictive Power of the MAAS and the MODTAS on Cued-Recall Performance 
 For each type of change (semantic, background, location), seven multiple linear 
regression analyses were run.  Separate multiple linear regressions were run to predict 
Test 1 cued-recall performance (total, same-context, and changed-context) and Test 2 
cued-recall performance (total, same-context, changed-context, not tested).  Each 
multiple linear regression analysis consisted of two steps.  In the first step, scores on the 
MAAS and scores on the MODTAS were entered as predictor variables, in stepwise 
fashion, with a significance cutoff of p = .05 for inclusion in the model.  In the second 
step, an interaction term (calculated by mean-centering each participant’s MAAS and 
MODTAS scores before multiplying them together) was entered, in a stepwise fashion, 
with a significance cutoff of p = .05 for inclusion in the model.  In the semantic change 
condition, cued-recall of not tested targets on Test 2 was significantly predicted by 
MAAS scores (see Table 8), F(1, 59) = 6.57, p = .013.  In the background change 
condition, cued-recall of not tested targets on Test 2 was significantly predicted by 
MODTAS scores (see Table 9), F(1, 59) = 4.63, p = .036.  No other regressions revealed 
























Multiple Linear Regression Results When Predicting Cued Recall of Not Tested Targets 









 t   p  
MAAS -.003 .102  -2.56   .013  
MODTAS --  --  1.28   .203  
MAAS x 
MODTAS 
-- --  -.57   .569  
  
Table 9  
 
Multiple Linear Regression Results When Predicting Cued Recall of Not Tested Targets 









 t   p  
MODTAS -.001 .074  -2.15   .036  
MAAS --  --  -.29   .772  
MAAS x 
MODTAS 
-- --  -.05   .963  
  
Predictive Power of the MAAS and the MODTAS on Memory for Prior Remembering 
 For each condition (semantic change, background change, location change), three 
multiple linear regression analyses were run.  Separate multiple linear regressions were 
run to predict the proportion of correct memory for prior remembering judgments for 
same-context targets, the proportion of correct memory for prior remembering judgments 








linear regression analysis consisted of two steps.  In the first step, scores on the MAAS 
and scores on the MODTAS were entered as predictor variables, in stepwise fashion, 
with a significance cutoff of p = .05 for inclusion in the model.  In the second step, an 
interaction term (calculated by mean-centering each participant’s MAAS and MODTAS 
scores before multiplying them together) was entered, in stepwise fashion, with a 
significance cutoff of p = .05 for inclusion in the model.  The only significant predictors 
were found in the semantic change condition.  Scores on the MODTAS significantly 
predicted accuracy of memory for prior remembering judgments for same-context targets, 
F(1, 59) = 5.21, R2 = .082, p = .026, and changed-context targets, F(1, 59) = 4.66, R2 = 
.074, p = .035.  Tables 10 and 11 display the beta weights, R2 values, t statistic, and 
significance for the models with significant predictors.  Scores on the MODTAS, scores 
on the MAAS, and their interaction term did not significantly predict contextual change 
difference scores in the semantic change condition. 
Table 10  
Multiple Linear Regression Results When Predicting Same-context Memory for Prior 








 t   p  
MODTAS .001 .082  2.28   .026  
MAAS --  --  .36   .719  
MAAS x 
MODTAS 


















Multiple Linear Regression Results When Predicting Changed-context Memory for Prior 









 t   p  
MODTAS .003 .074  2.16   .035  
MAAS --  --  .47   .641  
MAAS x 
MODTAS 














The purpose of this dissertation was to explore factors affecting memory for prior 
remembering.  Specifically, two factors that influence the accuracy of memory for prior 
remembering were explored by adapting a paradigm that was originally developed by 
Arnold and Lindsay (2002) and later used by Leppanen and Lyle (2018).  The two factors 
were context change and individual differences.  The discussion will first focus on the 
findings related to context change before moving on to a discussion of the individual 
differences findings. 
Context and Memory for Prior Remembering 
First, three different context changes were examined to test what types of 
contextual changes affect memory for prior remembering.  The effects of changing 
semantic, background, and screen location contexts on the accuracy of memory for prior 
remembering were compared.  I hypothesized that changing any contextual feature 
between instances of memory retrieval would impair memory for prior remembering of 
changed-context targets.  Participants learned a series of cue-target pairs and were asked 
to retrieve them twice.  On Test 1, participants retrieved targets in one of two contexts.  
In the same-context condition, cued-recall occurred in the same context throughout the 
course of the experiment.  In other words, the cue, background color, or location on 
screen of same-context targets never changed.  In the changed-context condition, cued-








semantic condition) between Test 1 and Test 2.  Consistent with previous research (e.g., 
Arnold & Lindsay, 2002; Leppanen & Lyle, 2018), changing the semantic context in 
which targets were retrieved impaired memory for prior remembering.  In contrast, there 
was no impairment caused by changes in background color context or screen location 
context.  In fact, memory for prior remembering improved following a change in screen 
location. 
This dissertation tested Arnold and Lindsay’s (2002; 2005) idea that memory for 
cognitive operations (e.g., an act of memory retrieval) operates on the same principles as 
memory for stimuli.  The current findings provided support for the idea that specific 
types of context change affect memory for stimuli and memory for prior remembering in 
the same fashion.  Cued-recall of changed-context targets on Test 1 was worse than that 
of same-context targets in the semantic change condition, but not in the background color 
or location change conditions.  A similar pattern was found when examining memory for 
prior remembering.  The difference was that memory for prior remembering of changed-
context targets was improved by a change in screen location rather than being unaffected 
by the change.  Therefore, it was shown that recall of targets and recall of previous acts 
of retrieval were similarly affected or unaffected by changes to specific types of 
contextual features. 
As was discussed in the introduction, researchers have suggested that contextual 
features can be categorized based on their associations with performance in different 
memory paradigms (e.g., cued-recall versus recognition).  One such categorization 
scheme separates contextual features into local and global feature categories (Dalton, 








in memory (e.g., the semantic condition in this dissertation), whereas global contextual 
features can be associated with many items in memory (e.g., the background and location 
conditions).  Previous research has shown that changing local contextual features 
between study and retrieval is associated with contextual change effects (e.g., Dalton, 
1993).  A contextual change effect is found when memory retrieval is impaired by 
retrieving an item in a different context than it was studied in.  Conversely, changing 
global contextual features between study and retrieval has inconsistent effects on memory 
retrieval (e.g., Smith, 1986).  For example, changing the physical location between study 
and test impairs free recall performance, but not recognition performance (Godden & 
Baddeley, 1980).  The present results suggest that contextual features should be separated 
into local and global categories when discussing effects of context change on memory for 
prior remembering.  The present dissertation utilized semantic context as an example of a 
local contextual feature, whereas both background color and screen location acted as 
global contextual features.  Changing a local contextual feature had an impairing effect 
on both cued-recall and memory for prior remembering, but changing global contextual 
features had inconsistent effects.  Cued-recall was not impaired by changing background 
color or screen location of the cue-target pairs, while memory for prior remembering was 
not affected by a change in background color and was improved by a change in screen 
location. 
The results may also be interpreted as a demonstration that changes to memory 
content impair memory for prior remembering, but changes to context do not.  Why may 
that be the case?  When you see the word bark, you may think about how that word 








meaning of the words could be interpreted as the stimulus being learned, rather than as a 
contextual feature.  At no point in this dissertation were participants asked to make the 
background color or the visual location of a stimulus the to-be-remembered information.  
Rather, they were instructed that the information would be present during retrieval.  
While semantic context is more focal to the stimuli being learned, I would nonetheless 
contend that the changes in this dissertation were to semantic context and not the content 
of the stimuli being learned.  Franco-Watkins and Dougherty (2006) defined semantic 
context as one word acting as the context for another word.  In this dissertation, 
participants learned homographic targets, which means each target could have multiple 
words that act as appropriate context.   That is a critical feature of the design because 
participants were tested on whether they had seen particular orthographic forms during 
the study phase and word meaning is not necessary to complete that task.  Without any 
semantic information acting as a retrieval context during Test 1 or Test 2, participants 
could still complete the cued-recall tests with the letters of a word they saw during the 
study phase.  So while it may seem as though the semantic information is necessary for 
successful cued-recall performance, the task can also be completed without it.  Semantic 
information is likely to make retrieving orthographic forms easier, but that benefit is 
derived from an association between the orthographic form of the stimulus (i.e., the 
content) and the semantic context of that stimulus.   
Background color may have had no effects on cued-recall or memory for prior 
remembering because of how global contextual features become associated with the 
content of memories.  I hypothesized that changing the background color would impair 








stimuli has been shown to lead to context effects (Isarida & Isarida, 2007).  However, that 
hypothesis was not supported by the present results.  Neither cued-recall nor memory for 
prior remembering were impaired by a change in background color.  It may be that too 
many targets were paired with the same color context, which could have led to cue 
overload (Rutherford, 2004).  Cue overload can occur when a specific contextual feature 
no longer serves as an effective retrieval cue because many stimulus items are paired with 
that same context.  Cue overload has been shown with as few as 20 items paired with one 
background color context (Isarida & Isarida, 2007).  This dissertation paired 35 items 
during Test 1 with either the white background context or the yellow background context, 
which could have led to cue overload and the background color becoming an 
uninformative retrieval cue.  If background color became irrelevant, then participants 
may have habituated to that particular feature and no longer attended to it (e.g., Turatto, 
Bonetti, & Pascucci, 2017; Wagner, 1979).  Habituation occurs when a stimulus that 
previously elicited a response from an organism ceases to do so.  If participants became 
habituated to the yellow background, they would no longer process it and it would no 
longer be associated with the cue-target pairs.  If the background color was never 
associated with the cue-target pairs during Test 1, then Test 1 and Test 2 would have had 
identical retrieval contexts.  Under those circumstances, changed-context targets would 
have been treated identically to same-context targets and memory for prior remembering 
would not be impaired.  That result was exactly what was found. 
Although cue overload and habituation can account for the null effect of 
background change on memory for prior remembering, it is less clear why changing the 








the effect was numerically small (a difference in accuracy of less than 2 percent), it was 
unexpected and bears consideration.  One possibility is that participants encoded the 
oculomotor response that they made to cue-target pairs at the bottom of the screen as an 
action that was associated with particular cue-target pairs.  Participants would then have 
had access to a greater number of retrieval cues for changed-context targets than same-
context targets when making their memory for prior remembering judgments.  In the 
same-context condition, cue-target pairs remained at the top of the screen (where they 
would have been expected to be up to that point in the experiment) and, as such, no 
additional oculomotor movements needed to be made to process the test pair.  However, 
in the changed-context condition, participants needed to actively shift their gaze to the 
bottom of the screen, adding an additional action that could subsequently be remembered.  
This idea could be tested using eye-tracking methodology to see if participants shift their 
gaze to the bottom of the screen during retrieval of changed-context targets during Test 2, 
despite the target no longer being presented there.   
Researchers have suggested that oculomotor responses are implicitly encoded as a 
type of spatial cue that can improve recognition memory (Bradley, Cuthbert, & Lang, 
1988).  Bradley et al. (1988) demonstrated that participants recognize words embedded in 
a string of digits faster when the oculomotor response made while viewing the stimuli is 
the same between study and test compared to when it differs, but with no benefit to 
accuracy.  It has also been shown that participants make saccades to empty areas of a 
computer screen where a visual stimulus was previously paired with auditory 
presentation of factual information when retrieving a memory for the fact which was 








response did not benefit recall accuracy compared to trials in which no saccades were 
made to the previous location of the visual stimulus.  Previous findings suggest that 
oculomotor responses can be implicitly encoded along with memory for a stimulus, but 
the binding of an oculomotor response to a stimulus does not benefit later retrieval of that 
stimulus.  Currently it is unknown whether implicitly-encoded oculomotor responses are 
associated with memory for prior remembering.  It would instead be advantageous to 
focus on the lack of any impairment caused by the change in screen location, which may 
have been caused by cue overload, as suggested previously for the background change 
condition. 
The likelihood that participants would endorse non-retrieved changed-context 
targets as previously retrieved differed across the three contextual change conditions (Not 
recalled/Recalled in Tables 2-4).  In the semantic change condition, relative to the 
background and location change conditions, participants were less likely to endorse 
changed-context targets they had just retrieved on Test 2 as also having been retrieved on 
Test 1.  This finding could be related to differences in the subjective experience of 
retrieving targets across different contexts, as suggested by Arnold and Lindsay (2002).  
Participants in the semantic change condition had subjectively different experiences when 
retrieving changed-context targets on Test 1 compared to when they attempted to retrieve 
them again in the original context on Test 2.  The change in subjective experience is 
believed to reduce the likelihood that the Test 2 retrieval context cues a memory for Test 
1.   
The results of this dissertation suggest that those in the background and location 








regardless of the Test 1 context.  That means that Test 2 would be more likely to cue a 
memory for Test 1, which could result in targets feeling like they were retrieved before 
when they were really cued but not retrieved.  A stronger feeling of experiencing a target 
during Test 1 could then result in the endorsement of the target as being previously 
retrieved, when it fact it was not.  However, in the semantic change condition, regardless 
of whether a participant successfully or unsuccessfully retrieved a target on Test 1, a 
change in subjective experience between the two tests would mean that the Test 2 
retrieval context would be unlikely to cue a memory for Test 1 at all.  That means that 
successful recall of a target on Test 2 would not cue participants to Test 1 as often, 
regardless of Test 1 retrieval success.  This argument is supported by the finding that, in 
the semantic change condition, the endorsement of same-context targets that were not 
previously retrieved on Test 1 as retrieved was higher than that of changed-context 
targets.  The endorsement of a not previously retrieved target as retrieved was essentially 
equivalent between same-context targets in the semantic change condition and that of 
changed-context targets in the background and location change conditions.  Under those 
three circumstances, the subjective experiences of Test 1 and Test 2 were likely similar 
and it was under those circumstances that merely being cued to retrieve a target was most 
likely to be misconstrued as successful retrieval. 
The argument that subjective experience has an impact on memory for prior 
remembering is also supported by the finding that there was no difference between the 
three conditions in the endorsement of not tested targets as previously retrieved.  As 
discussed, participants may partially make their memory for prior remembering 








Participants could have been more likely to have that belief when Test 2 felt subjectively 
the same as Test 1.  For participants in the background and location change conditions, 
compared to those in the semantic change condition, the Test 2 retrieval context was 
more likely to cue a memory for both retrieval success and failure during Test 1.  
Therefore, a difference in subjective experience was more likely to affect responding in 
the semantic condition than in the background or location conditions.  Such an effect of 
subjective experience could only be found with targets that participants attempted to 
retrieve on Test 1.  That is exactly what was found in this dissertation.  A change in 
context between Test 1 and Test 2 only affected memory for prior remembering 
judgments when there was an act of retrieval to be cued in the first place.  For not tested 
targets, there could be no association between those targets and any previous retrieval 
context, which would result in a similar subjective experience of those targets regardless 
of any context change. 
Individual Differences in Memory for Prior Remembering 
The second factor that was explored in the present dissertation was individual 
differences.  The specific question was whether dispositional mindfulness and absorption 
could be found to predict the accuracy of participants’ memory for prior remembering.  
Using multiple regression analyses, it was found that scores on the MODTAS 
significantly predicted the accuracy of memory for prior remembering of both same- and 
changed-context targets, but only in the semantic change condition.  Higher absorption 
scores were associated with better memory for prior remembering.  In contrast, scores on 









There was some predictive power of absorption on memory performance, but that 
predictive power was specific to few circumstances.  Following a change in semantic 
context, absorption significantly predicted memory for prior remembering of both same- 
and changed-context targets.  However, absorption did not generally predict memory 
performance.  If absorption provided an overall mnemonic benefit, then it should have 
significantly predicted performance across all of the memory measures in this dissertation 
(i.e., cued-recall and memory for prior remembering across all three types of change).  
Instead, absorption did not predict the accuracy of memory for prior remembering in the 
background or location change conditions.  In fact, the only other measure significantly 
predicted by absorption was cued-recall of not tested targets in the background change 
condition.   
Given that combination of findings, the predictive power of absorption may be 
specific to experimental task demands.  In the semantic change condition, the task 
requires that participants process the same targets with two different meanings, designed 
to create two distinct ways to subjectively experience each target.  Participants who are 
high in absorption may notice the difficulty of the task and shift their focus to thinking 
deeply about each target to try and remember how they thought about it.  That shift in 
attention could lead participants to elaborate on what a given target means, which could 
coincidentally bring the original study context to mind (which later becomes the Test 2 
retrieval context).  Under those circumstances, an association could be formed between 
the study context and the act of retrieval during Test 1, reducing the disparity in 
subjective experience between the two meanings of a word by associating them together.  








remembering would be improved.  In contrast, there may be no subjective difference 
between same- and changed-context targets on Test 1 in the background and location 
conditions.  In those conditions, participants who were high in absorption may not have 
experienced any task demands that would influence the focus of their attention on 
anything other than the immediate retrieval of targets.  The present results suggest that 
people who are high in absorption are better able to remember their internal cognitions, 
but they do not differ in their ability to remember external events.  Furthermore, 
absorption may only benefit memory for internal cognitions in situations in which 
attention is drawn to internal processing. 
Previous research has found mindfulness to be associated with better memory 
(e.g., Bonamo et al., 2015; Roberts-Wolfe et al., 2012), but the findings of this 
dissertation are inconsistent with that pattern.  In this dissertation mindfulness only 
significantly predicted cued-recall of not tested targets following a change in screen 
location.  Previous research has found that mindfulness training benefits cued-recall of 
Swahili-English word pairs (Bonamo et al., 2015) but dispositional mindfulness did not 
predict cued-recall of same- or changed-context targets on either Test 1 or Test 2 in this 
dissertation.  The beneficial effects of mindfulness on memory have been generalized to 
recognition memory (e.g., Lloyd et al., 2016) and free recall of specific autobiographical 
details (Heeren et al., 2009), but they did not generalize to memory for prior 
remembering.  Mindfulness may not have predicted memory for prior remembering 
because of a reduction in elaborative processing (Crawley, 2015).  Typically, memory 
benefits from elaborating on a stimulus and creating stronger associations between that 








that memory for prior remembering should benefit from elaboration (specifically, 
elaboration on internal cognitive processing), as well.  Elaborating on the cue-target pairs 
during Test 1 would be expected to create more associative links between the act of 
memory retrieval and previous experience.  Increasing the number of associations with 
the act of Test 1 cued-recall should increase the likelihood that a memory for Test 1 is 
retrieved later.  Because mindfulness practice is designed to teach people to notice 
internal thoughts and feelings before moving on from them (e.g., Kabat-Zinn, 2003) 
people who are naturally mindful may not spend much time elaborating on their own 
thoughts.  It may also be the case that mindful attention is related to the amount of effort 
needed to complete a task (Jensen, Vangkilde, Frokjaer, & Hasselbalch, 2012) and the 
conditions in the present dissertation may not have required more mindful participants to 
fully utilize their attentional resources.  Participants who are more mindful would attend 
to their internal cognitions, but may devote less effort to their attending to those 
cognitions which would reduce the likelihood of any elaboration on those cognitions.  In 
such a situation, mindfulness would not be expected to benefit memory for prior 
remembering, but it would not cause impairment either.  The present results do not 
support previous findings that mindfulness has general benefits to memory performance 
because mindfulness did not have an effect on memory for prior remembering. 
Effects of absorption and mindfulness on cued-recall performance were less clear.  
Both absorption and mindfulness predicted Test 2 cued-recall of not tested targets, but in 
different conditions.  Absorption predicted Test 2 cued-recall of not tested targets in the 
background change condition, whereas mindfulness predicted Test 2 cued-recall of not 








circumstances, participants who focus on the stimuli that they are recalling during Test 1 
will create stronger memories for those targets.  Later, on Test 2, those stronger 
memories may interfere with the weaker memory for targets which had not been seen 
since the study phase.  It is unclear, however, why that interference would occur in some 
conditions and not others. 
The results of the present dissertation suggest that absorption and mindfulness are 
separable constructs.  In the introduction, I proposed that both traits represent a person’s 
ability to focus on internal states and thoughts.  People who are high in absorption spend 
their time engrossed in their thoughts and fantasies.  In contrast, people who are high in 
mindfulness focus their attention on bodily sensations and thoughts in a non-judgmental 
manner before moving on from them.  Despite the similar emphasis on internally-focused 
attention, the two traits seem to represent different forms of attentional processing that 
affect memory differently.   
Mindfulness and absorption were not significantly correlated and were found to 
have different relationships with memory for prior remembering.  It could be that people 
who are high in absorption and those who are high in mindfulness process information 
differently with respect to the self.  People who are high in absorption may process their 
thoughts and fantasies in a way that allows them to integrate previous experience into 
those thoughts more readily.  In contrast, people who are high in mindfulness will 
acknowledge the thoughts and fantasies they are having, but instead pass on from them 
without integrating previous experiences into those thoughts.  In that way, people who 
are mindful will experience thoughts and feelings moment-to-moment, while people who 








other thoughts and fantasies over time.  Such a difference in how people process 
cognitions could underlie the disparate findings in whether mindfulness and absorption 
could be used to predict memory for prior remembering.  Deeper processing of an act of 
memory retrieval and elaborating on how it relates to other experiences would likely 
increase the number of previous experiences associated with that act of retrieval, which 
would increase the number of available retrieval cues and result in improved memory for 
prior remembering.   
People who are high in absorption may be more likely to be spontaneously 
reminded of previous contexts when retrieving a memory.  Leppanen and Lyle (2018) 
suggested that higher rates of spontaneous reminding should lead to improved memory 
for prior remembering.  People who are high in absorption are argued to think more about 
the information they are remembering.  While thinking about a given target, someone 
who is high in absorption could be more likely to spontaneously think about the study 
context and be better able to associate that context with the Test 1 retrieval context.  It 
could also be the case that people who are high in absorption are spontaneously reminded 
of the background color and screen location in which cue-target pairs were previously 
seen.  However, because memory for prior remembering in the background color and 
screen location conditions was near ceiling, there was reduced variability across all 
participants.  Reduced variability inherently makes it more difficult to find individual 
differences in performance, which could explain why no individual differences were 
found in either the background color or screen location conditions.  Future research 
should be conducted to see whether people who are high in absorption are better able to 








study cues during Test 1 has beneficial effects on memory for prior remembering 
(Leppanen & Lyle, 2018), absorption may benefit memory for prior remembering 
because those who are high in absorption are better able to retrieve the study cue for 
changed-context targets. 
Although not the main focus of this dissertation, it is of note that evidence of a 
testing effect on cued-recall was found.  A testing effect is found when practice retrieving 
information benefits later retrieval of that same information (Karpicke & Roediger, 
2008).  In all three change conditions of the present dissertation, Test 2 cued-recall of 
same- and changed-context targets was greater than that of not tested targets.  In other 
words, participants were better at retrieving targets on Test 2 that they had successfully 
retrieved on Test 1 than targets they had not attempted to retrieve before.  This is further 
evidence that memory retrieval itself is a process that has mnemonic benefits for later 
retrieval of the same information. 
Future Directions and Implications 
 Because people frequently make judgments about their memory for prior 
remembering, future research should be conducted that further explores the factors that 
underlie successful memory for prior remembering.  Memory for prior remembering is 
known to be affected by contextual information and individual differences in personality 
traits.  Future research could determine how context change and individual differences 
affect memory for prior remembering across the lifespan.  It has been shown that older 
adults have poorer memory for contextual information than younger adults (e.g., Burke & 
Light, 1981).  As such, I would predict that older adults have worse memory for prior 








older adults could demonstrate whether memory for prior remembering operates on the 
same principles across the lifespan.  Do local and global contextual features have similar 
effects on memory for prior remembering in older adults as they do in younger adults?  If 
older adults exhibit a similar pattern to younger adults, then despite overall poorer 
memory for prior remembering, changes in semantic context (local context) should be 
more impairing than changes to either background color or screen location context 
(global contexts). 
Studying memory for prior remembering also has implications for improving our 
understanding of cognitive aging.  Older adults are known to have greater difficult 
processing contextual information than younger adults (e.g., Chee et al., 2006) and it is 
known that context plays an important role in memory for prior remembering (e.g., 
Arnold & Lindsay, 2002).  As such, an impaired ability to remember prior remembering 
could be used as a marker for cognitive aging and lead to the development of cognitive 
interventions that could help mitigate declines in memory function. 
 Given that mindfulness training has been shown to have positive effects on 
memory (e.g., Bonamo et al. 2015), it should be tested whether mindfulness training has 
an impact on memory for prior remembering.  To do so, researchers could implement a 
brief mindfulness exercise into the retention interval between Test 1 and Test 2 and see 
whether the typical impairment caused by a change in semantic context persists or is 
alleviated.  Researchers have argued that mindfulness training improves performance on 
semantic memory tests because mindfulness increases access to a person’s network of 
learned semantic associations (e.g., Heeren et al., 2009).  Yet, in the present dissertation, 








involving semantic context.  The lack of a relationship between dispositional mindfulness 
and memory for prior remembering may reflect a propensity for mindful people to 
behave less mindfully under experimental conditions than they do in their everyday lives.  
If an experimental task requires participants to disregard their mindful tendencies (e.g., 
demanding working memory tasks like the operation span) then they may perform 
differently than their trait tendencies would suggest.  Mindfulness training may be used to 
reinstate mindful tendencies and reduce any effects that the context of an experiment may 
otherwise have on reducing trait mindfulness.  That idea is supported by the findings that 
mindfulness training typically improves memory performance (e.g., Bonamo, et al., 2015; 
Brown et al., 2016).  Therefore, participants may have their mindful tendencies 
upregulated by mindfulness training and subsequently approach experimental tasks 
differently.  If this were the case, then mindfulness training should improve memory for 
prior remembering. 
 The idea that mindfulness and absorption reflect different styles of internal focus 
on cognition could be further elucidated using a newly developed measure of attention.  
The Attentional Style Questionnaire (ASQ; Van Calster, D’Argembeau, & Majerus, 
2018) was developed to assess the biases that people may have in processing internal 
versus external information and whether that bias is carried out by the bottom-up or top-
down attentional network.  The difference between the bottom-up and top-down 
attentional networks lies in whether attention is being guided by external stimulation 
(bottom-up) or by volitional control (top-down).  Subscales of the ASQ were designed to 
measure internally-biased attention and externally-biased attention separately.  The 








people focus on their own thoughts and cognitions or on stimuli in the external world.  
According to Van Calster et al., a bias toward an internal, bottom-up attentional style 
reflects poor top-down attentional control over internal cognitions.  For instance, a person 
who has trouble moving on from their own intrusive thoughts is demonstrating an 
inability to exert top-down cognitive control over their internal attention to intrusive 
thoughts.  To test my idea that mindfulness and absorption reflect differences in 
internally-guided attention, scores on the ASQ could be associated with those on the 
MAAS and the MODTAS.  I would predict that scores on the MODTAS would be 
significantly positively correlated with the internal attention subscale of the ASQ and that 
scores on the MAAS would be significantly positively correlated with scores on the 
external attention subscale of the ASQ.  My idea that differences in internally-guided 
attention have an effect on memory for prior remembering could be directly tested by 
associating scores on the ASQ with memory for prior remembering. 
Conclusion 
In this dissertation, participants completed a three-phase memory for prior 
remembering procedure (Leppanen & Lyle, 2018) in which three different types of 
contextual change were made across conditions (semantic, background, location).  
Participants also completed the MAAS and the MODTAS to measure individual 
differences in internally-guided attention.  Changes in semantic context between Test 1 
and Test 2 impaired memory for prior remembering, but no impairment was found in the 
background and location change conditions.  I argued that differences in the association 
of the contextual features to individual items could be the cause of the disparate findings.  








the accuracy of memory for prior remembering of both same- and changed-context 
targets, but only in the semantic change condition.  No associations were found between 
dispositional mindfulness, as measured by the MAAS, and any measure of memory for 
prior remembering.  I argued that individual differences in elaboration of cognitive 
operations underlies the differential relationships between personality traits and memory 
for prior remembering.  In conclusion, contextual change cannot be assumed to be 
inherently problematic for memory for prior remembering and that individuals who 
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